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Our present practice presents the custodial parent with the 
Hobson's choice of absorbing the impact of significant daily 
deterioration in the purchasing power of fixed child support 
payments, or incurring substantial legal expenses in 
returning to court for needed modification.' 
American policy makers have given increasing attention to 
the economic problems faced by many single-parent households 
headed by women.2 Although a number of explanations have 
been offered for these families' poverty, many believe that 
American policies toward children impoverish households 
headed by women.3 Although this observation applies also to 
public support for families with children4 and to the amount of 
initial child support awards, I focus here on the impoverishing 
effects of child support modification rules. 
The prevailing American rule for child support 
modification in many instances requires the custodial parent, 
usually the mother, to absorb the effects of i n f l a t i~n ,~  the 
additional cost of raising older children: and changes in the 
child's needs,? regardless of changes in the obligor's income? 
To remedy these imbalances, sheg must bear the cost of 
pursuing a new action and, in most states, prove that a party's 
1. In re Marriage of Stamp, 300 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Iowa 1980). 
2 .  See, eg.,  Paula England & Irene Browne, Trends in Women's Economic 
Status, 35 SOC. PERSP. 17, 40-41 (1992) (1987 statistics) (for example, of families 
with children, 46.1% of female-headed households are poor, compared to 17.6% of 
those headed by males; of all families, with or without children, about 11% are 
poor). 
3.  See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION F FAMILY LAW 227-238 
(1989); see generally RIJTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST (1986). 
4. Commentators note that American public support for families with 
children is much lower than most other western countries. See generally CHILD 
SUPPORT ASSIJRANCE (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1992); CHILD SIJPPORT: FROM 
DEBT COLLECTION TO S O C ~  POLICY (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman eds., 
1988); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility 
and the Public Interest, 1989 ILL. L. REV. 367. 
5. See infra part II1.A. 
6. See infia part II1.B. 
7. See infia part III.C.2.a. 
8. See infia part 1II.C. 
9. Because about 85% of all single parent families are headed by women, I 
will refer to the custodial parent as "she" and the noncustodial parent as "he." See 
Daniel R. Meyer & Steven Garasky, Custodial Fathers: Myths, Realities, and Child 
Support Policy, 55 J .  MARR. & FAM. 73, 78 (1993). 
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circumstances have substantially changed since the date of the 
original order.'' Further, she must make this decision with 
little guidance as to the likelihood of success: she is generally 
ignorant of the obligor's true financial situation," and the 
judge's broad discretion to find that circumstances have or have 
not substantially changed creates even more uncertainty.12 
I believe that these imbalances, coupled with these 
disincentives for seeking child support modification, contribute 
to the poverty of families headed by women.13 In this Article, I 
discuss the American rule for child support modification and 
contrast with it rules allowing automatic adjustment of the 
support obligation. I also analyze several automatic adjustment 
mechanisms that courts could include in child support orders to 
avoid, in many instances, the necessity of subsequent judicial 
action.14 I conclude by recommending that courts allow 
automatic adjustment15 and advancing some new ideas to help 
remedy the imbalances facing custodial parents without 
duplicating the current system's disincentives to mod- 
ification. l6 
A. Standards Governing Child Support Modification 
In almost all American states, a parent obligated to pay 
child support (hereafter "obligor") makes periodic payments in 
an amount fixed by court order. Under the American rule for 
child support modification,17 the amount remains fixed 
10. See HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 727 (2d ed., student ed. 1988); infia part IV.B.1. 
11. See infra part IV.A. 
12. See infia part IV.B.1. 
13. Other writers have recognized problems associated with child support. See 
Tamar Lewin, Private Firms Help Single Parents Get What's Due, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 1994, at. A1 col. 2 (discussing collection difficulties); see also Philip K. Robins, 
Why Did Child Support Award Levels Decrease from 1978 to 19852, 27 J .  HIM. 
RESOURCES 362 (1992) (discussing these and other factors as contributing to the 
decline in child support award levels, and concluding that the largest factor in the 
decline was the rising wages of women). 
14. See infra part 111. 
15. See infra part 1II.D. 
16. See infia part IV. 
17. I use the term "American rule" for the majority rule governing the cir- 
cumstances that allow modification of a child support order. Except where the 
context otherwise suggests, I use the term to encompass the stricter UMDA mods- 
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throughout the period of the child's minority unless and until a 
parent initiates a new action and a court finds that the circum- 
stances of a t  least one of the parents, or of the child, have sub- 
stantially changed since the decree was rendered.18 Common 
post-decree changes of circumstances include inflation and an 
increase of some magnitude in the obligor's income.19 The Uni- 
form Marriage and Divorce Act (hereafter "UMDA"),"O adopted 
about two decades ago, promulgated a similar, but more strict, 
standard for child support modification: modification is permit- 
ted only where the circumstances of the parties have changed 
so much that the order has become unconscionable.21 
B. The Policies Supporting the American Rule 
1.  Satisfying the needs of the child 
The policy of discouraging subsequent modification may 
reflect a belief that the original amount of fixed child support 
adequately addresses the needs of a child, and that later modi- 
fication would seldom be necessary. A related assumption may 
be that a child's needs have little to do with a parent's income. 
These assumptions, however, are questionable. First, the as- 
sumption that the initial decree adequately pays for the child's 
costs is generally agreed to be erroneous despite controversy 
over the precise meaning of a child's Second, the as- 
sumption that a child's cost remains constant until the child is 
emancipated is faulty, since most families spend more on teen- 
age children than they do on younger ones.23 Finally, the as- 
cation rule, discussed in this part. I will discuss below some attempts by courts to 
establish different procedures for changing the amount of child support due. 
18. See CLARK, supra note 10, a t  727; HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN 
AMERICA 18 (1981). The exact phrasing of the standard varies. For example, in 
some states a substantial change in circumstances must be shown. See, eg., Holley 
v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Others require a substantial 
change in circumstances that makes the initial order improper or unfair. See 
Morrill v. Millard, 570 A.2d 387, 389-90 (N.H. 1990). Some add a requirement that 
the substantial change in circumstances must not have been contemplated by the 
parties when the decree was entered. See Bilosz v. Bilosz, 441 A.2d 59, 61 (COM. 
1981), superseded by statute as stated in Darak v. Darak, 556 A.2d 145 (Corn. 
1989); In re Marriage of Feustel, 467 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Iowa 1991). 
19. Of course, the custodial parent's income could also increase. 
20. 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). 
21. UMDA 5 316(a), 9A U.L.A. at 489-90. 
22. See ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECO- 
NOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 37-40 (1993). 
23. See infra part 1II.B. 
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sumption that a child's needs can be computed without consid- 
ering the financial condition of the parents defies empirical 
studies that confirm what may be obvious: the amount spent on 
a child is dependent upon the income of the family.24 Absent 
an  objective standard for needs, such as the cost of supporting 
a child at poverty level or a t  the level of "average" spending on 
children, computation of a child's "needs" requires consider- 
ation of the parents' financial condition. 
2. Discouraging numerous lawsuits 
Another policy behind these standards, stated in the con- 
text of the UMDA rule, is "to discourage repeated or insubstan- 
tial motions for rn~dification."~~ Judges consistently express 
concerns that family law disputes will overload court calen- 
dars? Discouraging lawsuits may also serve the laudable goal 
of discouraging former spouses from becoming mired in endless 
rounds of litigation. Although relevant, these concerns could be 
adequately addressed without making it difficult to modify a 
child support award. For example, the concern with clogging 
the courts could be remedied by entrusting the calculation of 
child support to an  administrative agency, as do other common- 
law countries including Britain and A~st ra l ia .~?  Requiring 
pre-trial mediation, limiting the frequency of modification, or 
barring modification actions that change support less than an 
established amount or percentage would also minimize the 
possibility of court conge~tion.~' Finally, replacing fixed 
awards with some type of periodic and automatic adjustment of 
child support would likewise eliminate the need to go to court. 
3. Facilitating the need to plan 
Further, the American rule purports to accommodate the 
parties' need to plan their post-divorce financial lives; under 
24. THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF 
PARENTAL EXPENDITURES 29 (1984); Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting 
Levels of Child Support Orders, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281, 288 (1987). 
25. UMDA $ 316 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 409, 490. 
26. See, e-g., Rand v. Rand, 392 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 Wd. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) 
(bemoaning the tendency of divorced parties to file frequent lawsuits). 
27. See Margaret Harrison, Child Maintenance in Australia: The New Era, in 
ECONOMIC ONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 219 (Lenore J. Weitzman and Mavis 
Maclean eds., 1992); Mavis Maclean, Child Support in the U.K.: Making the Move 
fiom Court to Agency, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 515 (1994). 
28. See infra note 149. 
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the American rule, parents are furnished with clear, precise, 
and fixed obligations. The American rule and UMDA child 
support modification rules give high priority to the parties' - 
right to know in advance their exact post-divorce obligations. 
Although a reasonable consideration, it is not clearly the para- 
mount one. Admittedly, some parties may attempt to plan addi- 
tional financial commitments in light of the amount of the 
initial child support award. Still, it is extremely difficult to 
predict the future circumstances of the parties. From a policy 
perspective, i t  seems more important to assure that the child 
support system contains a workable mechanism so the order 
can adjust to these future circumstances. I t  is simply impracti- 
cal and unfair to freeze child support based on the parties' 
circumstances when the decree is entered. 
4. Maintaining work incentives 
Current rules may also reflect a policy judgment that al- 
lowing children to share in the obligor's post-decree financial 
success skews the obligor's incentives to work for raises and 
promotes underemploy~nent.~~ The concept of underemploy- 
ment, a concern reflected in the child support law of many 
states, assumes that sharing a significant portion of one's in- 
come with those outside of one's household reduces the incen- 
tive to work hard. To truly avoid skewing an obligor's incen- 
tives, however, child support obligations would need to be 
nonmodifiable. The child support would then continue unaffect- 
ed by future changes in the obligor's financial condition. 
Although nonmodifiable child support orders would pre- 
serve the obligor's incentives, they would also be undesirable in 
several respects. First, it is probably pointless-and to many 
unfair or cruel-to expect an obligor to continue to make pay- 
ments a t  the same level after the obligor is laid off or becomes 
ill. Second, some believe that child support may appropriately 
be reduced when the obligor becomes responsible for the sup- 
port of other children. Also, a system that refuses to increase 
the obligation for a child who develops special needs unfairly 
forces the custodial parent to bear all such costs. It therefore 
seems both fair and inevitable to retain some means of modify- 
ing the child support order, at least in these situations. 
29. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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Freezing child support at a level based on the parties' 
financial circumstances at the time the decree was entered also 
ignores the youth of most divorcing couples.30 Since these cou- 
ples normally are still beginning their respective careers, and 
their earnings are relatively low, it would be unfair to bar the 
children from sharing in the obligor's later career success. If a 
modification rule requires the custodial parent to assume the 
risk of the obligor's financial setbacks, it seems equally fair t o  
permit the custodial parent and the children to share post- 
decree successes. Further, t o  sustain any articulated purpose of 
child support, whether to  meet the children's changing needs, 
to equalize the separated households' standards of living,31 or 
to shield the children from the negative financial effects of the 
parents' divorce,32 some allowance for modification is neces- 
sary. 
5. Gradual disentanglement of relationships 
I t  is also possible that the drafters of UMDA and, to a 
lesser extent, the supporters of the American rule contemplated 
a system similar to  that envisioned by Professor Chambers in 
his article, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Sup- 
port.33 He noted that divorced fathers frequently remarry, of- 
ten quickly after the divorce. These new partners of divorced 
fathers in many instances already have children from a prior 
relationship. He also pointed out that fathers in many instanc- 
es gradually lose contact with their children from the former 
marriage" and form new bonds with the children in the new 
30. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (2d 
ed. 1992); see also J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 1091, 1100 (1992) (reviewing DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS ( tephen 
D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990)). 
31. See June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of 
Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359 (1994); Milton C. Regan, The Boundaries of 
Care: Constructing Community after Divorce, 31 Hous. L. REV. 425 (1994). 
32. See generally Carbone, supra note 31. 
33. See David L. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child 
Support, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1614 (1982). 
34. Id. at 1624. See generally FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. 
CHERLIN, DMDED FAMILIES (1991); see also Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Christine 
W. Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of Childrearing After Marital Disruption, 47 J. 
MARRLAGE & FAM. 893, 902 (1985); Tamar Lewin, Father's Vanishing Act Called 
Common Drama, N.Y. RMES, June 4, 1990, at A18. But see Frank F. Furstenberg, 
Jr. et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental 
Contact, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 662-66 (1983) (estrangement appears to be abrupt). 
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household.35 Chambers mentioned the possibility of a new 
American consensus that noncustodial parents' obligations 
should last for only a short period after divorce.36 The trad- 
tional American rule regarding child support to  some extent ac- 
complishes a similar result due to the effects of inflation.37 
From this perspective, the American rule allows the support 
obligation to ebb as the absent parent's relationship with his 
children frequently ebbs. 
Most likely, however, the loss of value of child support 
awards under the American rule is inadvertent rather than 
intentional. First, neither the drafters of the UMDA nor Ameri- 
can courts have mentioned a policy such as Chambers'. Second, 
child support currently is not a short-term obligation; American 
law extends the child support obligation until the child reaches 
majority.38 Further, many contend that child support should 
be increased with the age of the child3' or even extended be- 
yond the age of majority, at least if the child is attending col- 
lege.40 
Instead of expressing a child support award as a fixed 
amount, the award could be drafted in various ways so that the 
amount due automatically changes without the need for addi- 
tional court action. I will discuss these alternatives below. 
A. Accounting for Inflation 
Expressing child support awards as a fixed amount causes 
inflation to erode their real value over time? This erosion 
35. Chambers, supra note 33. 
36. Chambers, supra note 33, at 1632-33. 
37. See infia part IIIA. 
38. See CLARK, supra note 10, a t  716. 
39. For example, Espenshade found that older children were significantly 
more expensive that younger ones. See ESPENSHADE, supra note 24, at 28-31. In 
light of this fmding, some guidelines take into consideration the age of the child 
when setting child support. 
40. See Margaret Campbell Haynes, Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for 
Reform, 27 FAM. L.Q. 7, 25 (1993); U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, 
SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, Recommendation No. 29, 
reprinted in Official Recommendations of the United States Commission on Inter- 
state Child Support, 27 FAM. L.Q. 31, 45 (1993); Judith S. Wallerstein & Shauna 
B. Corbin, Father-Child Rejutionships after Divorce; Child Support and Educational 
Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1986). 
41. I t  is true that the inflation rate has been decreasing during the past 
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obviously has substantial negative effects on the standard of 
living of the custodial parent and the Although short 
periods during this century have been deflationary rather than 
inflati~nary:~ the last four decades have been periods of con- 
tinuing inflati~n;~ and a period of significant deflation in the 
near future seems unlikely.45 
1. American courts' response to automatic adjustments for 
in flat ion 
a. General approval. More than any other automatic 
adjustment mechanism, courts have approved automatic peri- 
odic adjustment of child support t o  account for inflation; these 
automatic adjustments are called cost-of-living adjustments 
(hereafter "COLAS"). Judges generally seem to perceive COLA 
provisions to be fundamentally different from other adjustment 
procedures. COLA provisions are viewed as a means of merely 
retaining the real value of the initial order;6 rather than of 
"modifying" it. These courts have been sensibly receptive to a 
means of trying to  anticipate inflation without forcing the cus- 
todial parent to initiate a new legal action to increase sup- 
port.47 
decade. For example, from January 1979 to January 1984, the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average, increased 49.4%. In contrast, 
from January 1984 through January 1989, the index increased 18.8%, and from 
January 1989 through January 1994 it increased 20.7%. (Information obtained from 
the U. S. Dept. of Labor). Although the inflation rate has lowered, inflation still 
continues, and over a period of years can be significant. 
42. See BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 22, a t  121 (finding that child support 
orders would be 25% to 32% higher if adjusted for inflation, depending upon the 
period and inflation rate being studied); Gale M. Phelps & Jerald M. Miller, The. 
New Indiana Child Support Guidelines, 22 IND. L. REV. 203, 210 (1988) (calculat- 
ing that an order of $500 in 1976 would have declined in value to $261 by 1986 
unless modified). 
43. See Marriage of Mentel, 359 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (argu- 
ing that, because there have been periods of deflation, courts should not take judi- 
cial notice of inflation). 
44. See generally Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, U.S. City 
Average, 1956-1994, provided to the author by the U. S. Dept. of Labor. 
45. See Philip Eden, How Inflation Haunts the Court's Orders, FAM. ADV., 
Spring 1979, at  2, 3. 
46. See generally H-PA. v. S.C.A., 704 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1985); Brevick v. 
Brevick, 628 P.2d 599 (Ark Ct. App. 1981); Branstad v. Branstad, 400 N.E.2d 167 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980); In re Marriage of Stamp, 300 N.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Iowa 
1980); Hempton v. Hempton, 329 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Bradley v. 
Earl, 491 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 1985); Roya v. Roya, 494 A.2d 132, 133-34 (Vt. 
1985). 
47. For example, in In re Marriage of Stamp, 300 N.W.2d at 276-77, the 
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b. Courts' concerns and qualifications. One court stated 
that orders with COLA provisions, while less objectionable 
where the obligor has a steady job with regular salary increas- 
es to match inflation, were inadvisable where both parties were 
self-employed with significant oscillation of their incomes? 
This statement encompasses the fundamental objection to a 
COLA system: even in a period of inflation, there is no guaran- 
tee the obligor's income will increase commensurately. For this 
reason, the Washington Supreme Court has concluded that a 
COLA provision is unenforceable unless it provides for the 
possibility of an obligor's financial hard~hip.~'  Minnesota, a 
state that has adopted a COLA scheme by statute,50 deals 
with this problem by giving the obligor the right to petition the 
court to reduce or suspend the COLA increase upon a showing 
that the obligor's income did not increase by the amount of 
inflation? Still other courts have incorporated such a limit to 
COLA provisions in the decrees.52 
Unless the COLA provision sets forth the mechanics of the 
adjustment, however, it can be ambiguous and lead to dis- 
p u t e ~ . ~ ~  For example, a reference to the Department of Labor's 
court approved this decree: 
On or before each anniversary date of this decree, the parties shall file a 
stipulation with the Clerk of this Court providing for increased or de- 
creased child support payments based upon the following: Child support 
payments shall be increased or decreased by the same percentage as the 
percentage change in the National Consumer Price Index as published by 
the United States Department of Labor for the most recent twelve month 
period for which the data is available, provided that [the obligor's] gross 
income for the like period has increased by at least the same percentage. 
If [the obligor's] gross income increased by a lesser percentage, then the 
payments to [the obligee] shall increase by this lesser percentage. In the 
event [the obligor] claims the benefit of the above limitation, he shall 
submit copies of his federal tax returns or other sufficient proof of income 
to [the obligee] for the relevant years. If the parties are unable to stipu- 
late to the correct adjustment amounts, either may request that the Court 
may determine the same, either itself or by appointment of a special 
master. 
48. In re Marriage of Phipps, 379 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see 
also Falls v. Falls, 278 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
49. Edwards v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 883 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
50. MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 518.641 (West Supp. 1994). 
51. Id. In connection with the filing of any such affidavit, the obligor should 
be required to file other information that substantiates the income set forth in the 
affidavit, such as a copy of the prior year's W-2 form and a copy of a recent pay 
check. 
52. See In re Marriage of Garvis, 411 N.W.2d 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Roya 
v. Roya, 494 A.2d 132 (Vt. 1985). 
53. See McNeil v. McNeil, 607 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (Miss. 1992); Wing v. Wing, 
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cost of living index would not distinguish between its numerous 
different computations-some figures are national, while others 
are local. Another potential problem, seldom recognized by 
courts, is that the increase in average costs in the community 
may not correspond to any increase in costs relating to the 
particular child. Another objection is that a COLA adjustment 
merely tries to keep the real value of the award constant; it 
does not attempt to  adjust the award based upon any changes 
in the parties' circumstances. 
Sometimes courts have attempted to include in the decree 
an estimate of future annual inflation; under such decrees, the 
child support would automatically increase each year by the 
amount specified. Although fixing the annual increase in the 
order creates certainty, it also increases the potential for inac- 
curacy and has generated a mixed judicial response.54 
2. Analysis of automatic adjustment for inflation 
COLA systems have the advantage of being more simple 
than other automatic adjustment procedures, such as the per- 
centage of income system.55 Although they require periodic no- 
tification to the parties of the amount of the change in the cost 
of living and computation of the new child support amount, the 
additional administrative costs are probably small and would 
be justified by the benefits. In Minnesota, the state office of 
child support enforcement calculates the change in the cost of 
living every two years and notifies the parties of the presump- 
tive new order.56 Administrators of Minnesota's program indi- 
cated during informal discussions with the author that the 
program appears to be working well5' In the alternative, a 
549 So.2d 944, 948 (Miss. 1989); Bradley v. Earl, 491 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 
1985). 
54. Compare In re Marriage of Pfeffer, 443 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1989) (deleting from the order an annual increase of eight percent) with Wallace v. 
Wallace, 661 P.2d 455, 457 (Mont. 1983) (approving a provision calling for a five 
percent a ~ u a l  increase). See also Morrison v. Kirkland, 567 So.2d 363, 364 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1990) (rejecting an order calling for a $50 per month increase). Other 
courts have disapproved COLA provisions where the custodial parent earns a sig- 
nificant salary and receives a substantial amount of property at divorce. See In re 
Marriage of Brown, 462 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). 
55. See infia part 1II.C. 
56. The statute provides two different CPI indexes for the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul area. MNN. STAT. ANN. $ 518.641 (West Supp. 1994). 
57. Interview between the author and Len Biernat, Hamline Law School; 
Interview between the author and Karen Smigielski, Office of Child Support En- 
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state could promulgate one COLA annually that would govern 
all decrees. This COLA system would be clear, although it 
would still require individual computation of the amount of the 
change in each support award. If either of these two systems is 
perceived as requiring too much action by state employees, the 
parties could be given the responsibility of agreeing upon the 
amount of the new award, and filing a stipulation with the 
court setting forth the new amount.58 
The COLA system seems clearly better than the current 
system of fixed awards. Pursuant to the COLA system, the real 
value of the child support order remains the same; in contrast, 
under the current system, the real value of the award gradual- 
ly diminishes. The COLA system requires no information from 
either parent. It seems relatively simple and will require little 
court time. Furthermore, COLA indexes are relatively accurate 
in measuring the local inflation rate because they track chang- 
ing prices in the local area; courts can use these indexes to 
ensure that COLA provisions effectively maintain the value of 
the child support order. Some administrative expense will be 
incurred, of course, t o  staff the child support office. In contrast 
to percentage of income orders:' child support orders with 
COLA provisions retain the collection options available when 
the order is expressed in a fixed dollar amount. For example, 
the order may easily be enforced by contempt. 
One disadvantage of the COLA mechanism is that it freez- 
es the real value of the child support a t  the amount set forth in 
the initial decree. It does not automatically adjust due to any 
changes in the parties' circumstances; this would require one 
parent to initiate a legal modification action, unless some type 
of automatic review and adjustment system is created?' 
B. Accounting for the Increased Costs of Raising 
Older Children 
Although most families spend more on teenage children 
than they do on younger ones,61 few courts have been recep- 
forcement. 
58. For example, this was the procedure approved in In re Marriage of 
Stamp, 300 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1980) (permitting a hearing before a special master, 
with both parents sharing the cost of the proceeding, if the parties could not agree 
on the new amount). 
59. See infra part 1II.C. 
60. I will discuss this below. See infra part 1V.C. 
61. DAVID BETSON, ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF CHILDREN FROM 
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tive to orders automatically increasing child support when the 
child reaches a certain specified age.62 This trend reflects 
judges' general reluctance in family law cases to consider fu- 
ture events that are possible but not certain to occur.63 Appel- 
late courts admonish trial courts to make a determination 
based upon facts as they now exist regarding the needs of the 
child and the ability of both parents to bear these costs.64 In- 
creases based upon the child's becoming older are perceived to 
be spe~u la t ive .~~  Even assuming that a child's costs will in- 
crease with age, some courts express reservations because the 
parents' future relative incomes are uncertain." Other courts 
state that a child support order may only be modified upon a 
showing of a post-decree change of circumstances; an  automatic 
increase, without a showing of a change in circumstances, 
would violate this principle. 
Despite this general reluctance, some courts have allowed 
automatic adjustment to compensate for the increased costs of 
raising older ~hildren.~' For example, one court approved an 
order pursuant to which the child support due increased five 
percent per year." Additionally, the guidelines of a few states 
THE 1980-86 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY 49 (1990); LEWIN/ICF, ESTIMATES OF 
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN AND CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 4-21 (1990) (submit- 
ted to the Ofice of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Dep't 
of Health and Human Sews.). See generally ESPENSHADE, supra note 24, at 30-31. 
Cf. Irwin Garfmkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in Fam- 
ily Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24 FAM. 
L.Q. 157, 169-70 11.31 (1990). 
62. See, e.g., Morrison v. Kirkland, 567 So. 2d 363 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); 
Royse v. Royse, 491 N.E.2d 397, 401-402 (Ohio Common Pleas 1984); Eikenhorst v. 
Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Abrams v. Abrams, 713 
S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
63. For example, most divorce courts only consider tax effects of a divorce 
property division if the tax consequence is caused by the decree and is certain; 
other potential tax effects that might occur later are not considered. See generally 
J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIRUTION OF PROPERTY 
§ 13.03[5] (1994). 
64. See Morrison, 567 So. 2d a t  364; Penkoski v. Patterson, 440 So. 2d 45, 
46-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
65. See In re Marriage of Moore, 453 N.E.2d 102, 104-105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); 
McManus v. McManus, 348 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Wallace v. 
Wallace, 661 P.2d 455, 458 (Mont. 1983) (Haswell, J., dissenting in part); Lairmore 
v. Lairmore, 617 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1980); Fossum v. Fossum, 374 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 
1985); In re J.M. & G.M., 585 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
66. See, e.g., Royse, 491 N.E.2d at 401-02; Condon v. Condon, 312 S.E.2d 588, 
589 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
67. See ESPENSHADE, supra note 24, at 28-31; see also BETSON, supra note 61; 
LEWINDCF, supra note 61  (discussing the rising cost of older children). 
68. Wallace, 661 P.2d a t  457. Three justices dissented in part, arguing that 
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provide that child support should be higher for older children 
than for younger children.6g 
Each automatic adjustment mechanism has its own advan- 
tages and disadvantages. For example, the automatic step-up 
based upon age has the benefit of not requiring any informa- 
tion or action by anyone; the order merely changes at  a certain 
specified point. This lowers transaction and administrative 
costs of the adjustment. Of course, it is unclear whether the 
actual future costs of the child will deviate from the average 
trend; although it is probable the child will cost more, it is not 
certain.70 Also, there is no certainty that the income of the 
obligor will increase, thereby enabling the obligor to afford the 
higher ~os ts .~ '  
Some of these problems could be solved, or at  least mini- 
mized, by giving the obligor the right to file an affidavit stating 
that the costs of the child had not increased by the designated 
amount or that his income had not increased sufficiently to 
meet the modified obligation. By filing this affidavit, the obligor 
would avoid the step-up in support provided in the decree. The 
affidavit solution, however, would create two additional prob- 
lems. First, allowing the obligor t o  avoid the increase imposes 
all of the inflation and the costs of older children on the custo- 
dial parent regardless of her ability t o  bear the costs. Second, 
the additional procedure could increase the number of court 
hearings that would be required. Even if these problems could 
the automatic annual increase, not tied to the inflation rate, was inappropriate. 
Because the increase was annual and might be said to be a rough approximation 
of the inflation rate, this might be considered a COLA case. Compare this case to 
Morrison v. Kirkland, 567 So. 2d 363, 364 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), where the court 
disapproved an award that provided for a $50 per month increase in the award. 
Another court approved a provision increasing the child support by $50 per month 
on the first anniversary of the decree where the parties had agreed to such an 
adjustment mechanism. Cisneros v. Cisneros, 787 S.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1990). Also, another court has refused to enforce an order that increased child 
support by eight percent annually. In re Marriage of Pfeffer, 443 N.W.2d 92, 95 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1989). 
69. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1 (Supp. 1994); Mass. Child Supp. 
Guidelines (Oct. 1, 1989), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CHILD SUPPORT 
GUIDELINES: A COMPENDIUM 433, 434-37 (1990); see also WASH. REV. CODE 
9 26.19.011 (West. Supp. 1994) (varying the child support obligation on the age of 
the child and the obligor's income, but not expressly based upon percentage of 
obligor's income). 
70. See Lairmore v. Lairmore, 617 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1980). 
71. Of course, one might say that i t  is not clear that the custodial parent can 
bear these increased costs, but the current system effectively imposes those costs 
on the custodial parent. 
856 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
be resolved, the automatic step-up based on age is less desir- 
able than an automatic adjustment mechanism based on a 
COLA system or on a percentage of the obligor's income. 
C. Accounting for Changes in the Obligor's Income 
Courts have been generally unreceptive to attempts to 
automatically adjust the amount of child support due based 
upon post-decree changes in the obligor's income.72 Courts es- 
pecially disapprove of the percentage of income method, which 
expresses a child support award as a specified percentage of 
the obligor's salary.73 Although some of this disapproval stems 
from statutory and traditional attachment to the 
American rule,75 many courts have articulated significant poli- 
cy concerns with orders that automatically adjust to changes in 
the obligor's income. In this part, I discuss and evaluate the 
benefits of these orders and the major concerns with them. 
1. The benefits of percentage of income orders 
The obvious benefit of the percentage of income method is 
that  it requires no action to adjust to the current circumstances 
of the obligor. If a state desires to base child support modifica- 
tion decisions solely on the obligor's income, this method is 
desirable for its very low transaction costs. Wisconsin now 
permits courts to express a child support order as a percentage 
of income," and this system apparently has worked fairly well 
for some types of obligors.77 Indeed, Wisconsin courts now use 
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ferguson, 566 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(construing IU. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505(a)(5) (1989)). See also cases cited infra 
notes 73-75, 82-113. 
73. Newsome v. Newsome, 227 S.E.2d 347, 348-49 (Ga. 1976) (disapproving 
percentage of income method). 
74. Some courts have found that the percentage of income method is invalid 
under child support statutes allowing modification only under a substantial change 
in circumstances standard because not every increase in income constitutes a sub- 
stantial change in circumstances. See Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
75. Some courts, apparently uncomfortable with departures from the American 
rule, merely reiterate the idea that child support should be expressed in the form 
of a fured dollar amount and that it should only be modified via a modification 
action after the court has heard all relevant information. Set?, e.g., Breen v. Breen, 
471 N.Y.S.2d 617 (App. Div. 1984). 
76. Wis. Child Support Percentage of Income Standard, WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
$ HSS 80.03(3), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, a t  1000. 
77. Letter from Robert Cook, Esq., Cook & Franke, to J. Thomas Oldham 
(May 10, 1994) (on file with the author) ("The system is working very well."); Let- 
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percentage of income orders about as frequently as fixed sum 
order~. '~  
A few other states have accepted percentage of income 
 award^.'^ Although Texas courts do not permit percentage of 
income awards by judicial decrees, if the parties agree to such 
provisions, these are enforced.80 An Indiana court has moved 
toward automatic adjustment by allowing adjustment of the 
child support obligation based upon the state's income shares 
guideline.81 
2. A percentage of income order neglects releuant factors 
a. The needs of the child. One criticism, however, is that 
the obligor's income is not the only factor that should be consid- 
ered when deciding upon the appropriate amount of child sup- 
port Courts frequently note that the percentage of in- 
come method improperly ignores the needs of the In 
ter from Susan Hansen, Esq., Hansen, Gagne & Foley, to J. Thomas Oldham (May 
10, 1994) (on file with the author) (also noting the benefits of such orders when 
the obligor's income is relatively stable, but does not think they should be used 
where the obligor does not have a stable job); Letter from Gregg Herman, Esq., 
Loeb, Herman & Drew, to J. Thomas Oldham (Feb. 15, 1994) (on file with the au- 
thor) ("Virtually all would agree with me that the system by which the parties can 
elect and the court order either a floating percentage order or a futed dollar 
amount is a good one."); Interview between J. Thomas Oldham and Marygold 
Melli, Professor, Wisconsin Law School (Feb. 7, 1994); Letter from Anne Wadsack, 
Dewitt & Porter, to J. Thomas Oldham (May 10, 1994) (on file with the author) 
(Where the obligor's income is relatively steady, or generally increasing, it is a 
very useful and equitable device."). 
78. See Judi Bartfeld & Irwin Garfinkel, Utilization and Effects of Payments 
on Percentage-Expressed Child Support Orders, INSTITUTE FOR RES. ON POVEW, 
June 1994, at  7. 
79. See also infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing acceptance of 
percentage of increase orders). 
80. Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Malone v. Malone, 
637 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (summarized in 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 
1361 (1994)). 
81. Herron v. Herron, 457 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); see also 
Henderson v. Lekvold, 621 P.2d 505 (3T.M. 1980) (enforcing a decree which in- 
creased the child support, if the obligor's income increased, to an amount as speci- 
fied in the guideline in effect a t  the time of the increase in the obligor's income). 
82. See, e.g., Euston v. Euston, 759 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). 
83. Id.; Hunter v. Hunter, 498 N.E.2d 1278, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see 
also In re Marriage of Meeker, 272 N.W.2d 455, 456 (Iowa 1978); Stanaway v. 
Stanaway, 245 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Thrash v. Thrash, 809 P.2d 
665, 667 (Okla. 1991) (holding that court has no authority to order such an award, 
but that parties may agree to it); Picker v. Vollenhover, 290 P.2d 789, 801 (Or. 
1955); Hood v. Hood, 335 N.W.2d 349 (S.D. 1983); Karim v. Karim, 290 N.W.2d 
479 (S.D. 1980); Barlow v. Barlow, 282 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); 
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particular, a substantial increase in the obligor's income may 
cause the payments to exceed the needs of the child?* This 
defect is particularly important if one is applying a "needs- 
based" standard when computing the appropriate amount of 
child support. This standard bases child support upon evidence 
of the costs of the child and not upon the parents' incomes. The 
partiesy relative incomes are relevant only in the allocation of 
the child support obligation between the parents. This standard 
is inconsistent with a policy that would automatically permit 
modification upon a showing of change in the obligor's income. 
The percentage of income model reflects a policy judgment that 
the child has a claim to a certain percentage of the obligor's 
income, while the needs-based standard reflects the different 
view that the child has a claim to have his needs met. 
Recognizing that a child's needs are to a large extent deter- 
mined by the resources of the however, all states 
have ostensibly moved away from an express needs-based mod- 
el toward guidelines based upon the income of one or both 
parents. Drafters of the guidelines have generally been per- 
suaded that each divorced parent has the duty, post-divorce, to 
allocate to a child the same portion of his income that would 
have been allocated while the family was intact? Under cur- 
rent guidelines, the needs of the child are not considered, ex- 
cept as a ground for deviation from the presumptive amount. 
b. The custodial parent's income. Percentage of income 
orders also ignore, in addition to the needs of the child, the 
earnings of the custodial parent? Only about one-third of all 
state guidelines now accept that the obligor's income should be 
the sole factor that determines the amount of child support? 
Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 254 
S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1979); Keyser v. Keyser, 345 S.E.2d 12 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). 
84. Brevick v. Brevick, 628 P.2d 599, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting a 
child support award expressed as 30% of the obligor's income); see also Chasin v. 
Chasin, 582 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (App. Div. 1992). 
85. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
86. See generally Williams, supra note 24, at 292. 
87. Id.; Hunter v. Hunter, 498 N.E.2d 1278, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see 
also In re Marriage of Meeker, 272 N.W.2d 455, 456 (Iowa 1978); Stanaway v. 
Stanaway, 245 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Thrash v. Thrash, 809 P.2d 
665, 667 (Okla. 1991) (holding that the court has no authority to order such an 
award, but that parties may agree to it); Picker v. Vollenhover, 290 P.2d 789, 801 
(Or. 1955); Hood v. Hood, 335 N.W.2d 349 (S.D. 1983); Karim v. Karim, 290 
N.W.2d 479 (S.D. 1980); Barlow v. Barlow, 282 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1955); Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 
254 S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1979); Keyser v. Keyser, 345 S.E.2d 12 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). 
88. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69 (about one-third 
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About two-thirds reject this as too limited and follow the in- 
come shares guideline or Melson formula; both consider the 
income of both spouses when calculating the presumptive child 
support award.89 The percentage of income model could appar- 
ently be applied only in those jurisdictions whose guidelines 
are based solely upon the income of the non-custodial par- 
ent.90 This defect is particularly important in those states ap- 
plying the income shares guidelines or the Melson f~ rmula .~ '  
Both of these approaches consider the income of both parents 
to calculate the child support award, while the percentage of 
income approach only looks to the income of the noncustodial 
parent. A state following either approach could therefore only 
accept a percentage of income order under the assumption that 
the parents' incomes change in roughly the same relative 
amounts. 
c. Other relevant factors. The percentage of income 
method also ignores the obligor's ability to pay, multiple mar- 
riage problems, and the custodial parent's need for stable pay- 
ments. For example, if the obligor is laid off, the method may 
totally relieve an obligor of all child support obligations despite 
his ability to pay some amount, as when the obligor has other 
assets.g2 It  may also require an obligor to pay more child sup- 
port even when his ability to pay does not rise with the award, 
a problem especially acute when the adjustment is based upon 
changes in the obligor's hourly rate and not upon actual month- 
ly earnings.93 The percentage of income method may present 
related problems in a multiple marriage situation.94 The 
method does not generally contemplate the possibility that the 
obligor will remarry and establish a new family, or that the 
custodial parent will remarry.g5 Courts also worry that this 
of all states base child support solely on the obligor's income). 
89. See Williams, supra note 24; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra 
note 69; Judicial Council of California, Review of Statewide Uniform Child Support 
Guideline (Dec. 1993) a t  29. 
90. For a list of these states, see Judicial Council of California, supra note 
89, at  29. Alternatively, a percentage of income system could be created that ad- 
justs the child support due based upon the income of both parents. 
91. See Williams, supra note 24, at 291-95 (discussing the income shares 
model of child support); id. at 295-301 (discussing the Melson formula, adopted in 
Delaware). 
92. Brevick v. Brevick, 628 P.2d 599, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); see also 
Roszko v. Roszko, 705 P.2d 951, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Newsome v. Newsome, 
227 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ga. 1976). 
93. See Jensen v. Jensen, 629 P.2d 765 (Mont. 1981). 
94. Price v. Price, 606 S.W.2d 51, 52-53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
95. This would need to be dealt with via a modification action, if state law 
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method could cause the amount of child support received to  
oscillate a great deal, causing financial hardship to the custodi- 
an.96 
A further objection is that the percentage of income stan- 
dard fails to replicate the expenditures that the parents would 
have made for the child had they remained together, because it 
allocates a constant percentage of income to child support. 
Intact families' child support expenditures, on the other hand, 
diminish as a percentage of income as the families' income 
 increase^.^? This objection applies with special force to those 
states adopting the income shares guidelines, which are cal- 
culated in recognition of the diminishing share of income allo- 
cated t o  children.g8 Unless adjusted, the percentage of income 
method conflicts with the policy judgment that child support 
should mirror intact families' actual spending habits. Some 
states address this concern by exempting from the calculation 
obligor income above a stated amount.g9 Courts could also ad- 
dress that concern by incorporating a sliding percentage scale 
into the adjustment order. 
3. A percentage of income order may encourage underemploy- 
ment 
Courts have also been concerned that the percentage of 
income method could encourage underemployment more than 
the traditional fixed-sum order.'OO Given the custodial 
permits modification in these circumstances. See infra notes 119-120. 
96. Means v. Means, 511 N.E.2d 323, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
97. See, e.g., ESPENSHADE, supra note 24, at  25-29; Williams, supra note 24, 
a t  288. Not all studies confirm that spending on children gradually decreases as a 
percentage of the family's income gradually as the family's income increases. See 
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 61. 
98. See Williams, supra note 24, at  288-89 (explaining the proportionate re- 
duction as costs rise); id. at  292 (the income shares model incorporates this eco- 
nomic evidence). Some research corroborates that the percentage of income spent 
on children decreases as income increases. See ESPENSHADE, supra note 24, a t  25- 
29; LEWINDCF, supra note 61, at 4-21. Others question whether the percentage re- 
ally decreases. See Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 97, at 169 11-31. 
Surprisingly, under the District of Columbia's guideline, based on the percent- 
age of income model, the obligor's percentage increases as the obligor's annual 
income goes from $7,500 to $75,000. D.C. CODE ANN. $ 16-916.1 (Supp. 1994); see 
also MINN. STAT. ANN. $ 518.551 (West Supp. 1994); Mass. Child Supp. Guiddines 
part III(A) (Oct. 1, 1989), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, 
at  438; N.D. Guidelines for Absent Parent Child Supp., in NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
STATE COURTS, supra note 69, at 713. 
99. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. $ 14.055(c) West Supp. 1994). See gener- 
ally Williams, supra note 24, at 169. . 
100. See Roszko v. Roszko, 705 P.2d 951, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Under the 
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parent's transaction costs of seeking modification, an obligor 
with a fixed obligation may assume that he will retain all post- 
decree wage increases. An obligor with a percentage of income 
obligation, on the other hand, would understand that he would 
have to share wage increases with the custodial parent. To 
avoid the underemployment incentive and still permit children 
to share in later career advancement, the child support obliga- 
tion could be based on a "normal" career path for someone with 
the obligor's experience and training rather than on what actu- 
ally happens.lO' The difficulty and expense of predicting the 
"normal" career path, however, make this alternative unwork- 
able. These propbsals are also probably unnecessary, since the 
only study on underemployment disincentives under percentage 
of income orders concluded that the obligor's work effort does 
not vary significantly from the work effort under a fixed sum 
order. lo2 
4. A percentage of income order may create enforcement prob- 
lems 
Percentage of income orders may also be difficult to en- 
force.lo3 First, determining the obligor's "income" for purposes 
of the support calculation can sometimes be quite 
The difficulty is often exacerbated by the obligor's incentive 
and ability to manipulate his apparent income. To avoid these 
problems, Wisconsin courts, lawyers, and child support workers 
are reluctant to apply the percentage of income method to self- 
employed obligors.lo5 In addition, Wisconsin administrators 
American rule, voluntary reduction of post-decree income generally is not grounds 
for a modification of the child support award. See In re Marriage of Powell, 474 
N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). A substantial body of case law, exemplified by these 
cases, discusses the possibility of underemployment. The question usually arises 
when the obligor petitions t o  reduce his child support obligation to reflect a post- 
decree salary decrease. 
101. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR AND ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME 
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 175-77 (1988) (discussing a similar proposal). 
102. See M.M. Klattiwer, Child Support Awards and the Earnings of Divorced 
Fathers, SOC. ScI. REV. (forthcoming). 
103. Breiner v. Breiner, 236 N.W.2d 846 (Neb. 1975); see also Means v. Means, 
511 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 328 A.2d 625 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Petersen v. Petersen, 428 A.2d 1301, 
1303-04 (N.J. 1981); Provenzano v. Provenzano, 418 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1979). 
104. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Winne, 606 N.E.2d 777, 783-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992) (considering whether amounts allocated by an employer to the parent's capi- 
tal account were "income" for purposes of the child support guideline); Mabee v. 
Mabee, 617 A.2d 162, 164 (Vt. 1992) (discussing whether capital gains are income). 
105. Letter from Gregg Herman, Esq., supra note 77; Letter from B o ~ i e  
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find it difficult to determine whether an order expressed as a 
percentage of income is in arrears.lo6 Even if an obligor is 
employed and garnishment is available, child support obliga- 
tions for non-salary income other than wages1" are also diffi- 
cult to monitor under a percentage of income order. Of course, 
such other sources of income could be included in the definition 
of income for purposes of the child support obligation, but an 
employer would have no knowledge of the employee's income 
from such sources and could not withhold additional child sup- 
port based on such additional income. Since relatively few 
obligors probably receive substantial income from sources other 
than salary, outside income should not present a significant 
problem. Of those obligors who do have substantial outside 
income, the custodial parent could pursue a private claim for 
any additional child support due, facilitated by the periodic ex- 
change of financial information I suggest below.108 
Enforcement problems should be minimal where most of 
the obligor's income comes from a stable job. Employers can 
compute the amount of child support without great difficulty 
even where expressed as a percentage of the obligor's income, 
making garnishment a viable option despite changes in in- 
come.log Basing guidelines on gross income, as Wisconsin 
does, further simplifies the employer's task. The guidelines 
should also clarify which employee benefits are considered 
income and which deductions from income are permitted.l1° 
Percentage of income orders could also be useful if the income 
of the obligor oscillates and the obligor could afford different 
levels of child support a t  different times. Of course, this might 
cause the custodial household some uncertainty. 
Abramoff, Esq., Case, Drinka & Diel, to J. Thomas Oldham (June 17, 1994) (on 
file with the author); Telephone interview with Connie Chesnick, Wisconsin Depart- 
ment of Health and Social Services (Mar. 4, 1994). 
106. Letter from Bonnie Abramoff, Esq., supra note 105; Letter from Carlo 
Esqueda, Division Manager, Dane County (Wisconsin) Courts Division Manager, to 
J. Thomas Oldham (June 7, 1994) (on file with the author); Telephone interview 
with Connie Chesnick, supm note 105. 
107. For example, royalties, rents, interest, dividends or capital gains. 
108. See infia part IVA. 
109. Telephone Interview with Connie Chesnick, supra note 105; Letter from 
Gregg Herman, Esq., supra note 77. 
110. See, e.g., TM. FAM. CODE ANN. 8 14.053(b) (West Supp. 1994) (deducting 
social security taxes and federal income taxes for a person "claiming one personal 
exemption and the standard deduction" to compute the applicable income figure for 
the guidelines). 
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Contempt enforcement is probably unavailable for percent- 
age of income orders. To be enforceable by contempt, an order 
must clearly state what the party is ordered to  do.''' An or- 
der to pay a percentage of one's "income" may not be clear, 
particularly if the applicable income figure includes deductions 
for a number of specified costs. For example, Texas calculates 
its child support from the obligor's "net resources," which are 
defined as gross income112 less social security taxes and fed- 
eral income tax withholding for a single person claiming one 
personal exemption and the standard deduction. I am not confi- 
dent that a court would conclude that an order to pay a certain 
percentage of an obligor's net resources would be sufficiently 
clear to  be enforceable by ~ontempt."~ 
5. Possible improvements to the percentage of income child 
support order 
As discussed above, after the promulgation of guidelines 
states are increasingly basing child support on parents' in- 
comes rather than childrens' needs,ll4 a basis more compati- 
ble with orders automatically adjusting to  changes in the 
obligor's income. Possibly due to this changing conception of 
child support, a minority of courts have been receptive to or- 
ders that automatically varied the amount of child support due 
based upon changes in post-divorce income of the obligor. Al- 
though the percentage of income order has generally been 
disfavored, courts have been more receptive to  the percentage 
of increase method.ll5 The percentage of increase method ex- 
presses the award as a fixed amount, generally computed from 
the guidelines based upon the information that exists at  the 
111. See generally J. THOMAS OLDHAM, TEXAS MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 473 
(2d ed. 1992). 
112. Gross income includes wages and all other income such as bonuses, in- 
terest, net rental income, capital gains and dividends. 
113. Other states, such as Wisconsin, apply their guidelines t o  gross income. 
Wis. Child Support Percentage of Income Standard, WIS. ADMIN. CODE 5 HSS 
80.03, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, at  1000-01 (estab- 
lishing support order formulas). This could be somewhat easier for the obligor to 
comprehend than net income schemes like that of Texas. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
115. See, e.g., Roszko v. Roszko, 705 P.2d 951, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (up- 
holding percentage of increase method); Hayes v. Hayes, 283 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 
1981); Jensen v. Jensen, 629 P.2d 765 (Mont. 1981); Heinze v. Heinze, 444 A.2d 
559 (N.H. 1982); In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 584 P.2d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1978); Madison v. Madison, 859 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1993). 
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time of the decree, plus a specified percentage of any future 
increase in the obligor's salary. While the percentage of income 
method automatically adjusts when an obligor is laid off7 the 
percentage of increase method only automatically adjusts up- 
ward; to lower the amount due, the obligor must initiate an 
action for a modification. The percentage of increase order is 
perceived to be better than the percentage of income order 
because the former guarantees the custodial parent a specified 
minimum amount and lack of compliance is easier to detect. 
Other variations could make automatic adjustments ac- 
ceptable to more courts. For example, courts have approved 
orders that set a maximum amount the obligation can increase, 
regardless of how much the obligor's income  increase^."^ This 
limitation would ensure that the obligor's payment does not 
substantially exceed the child's needs and would reflect in part 
the finding that families' spending on children as a percentage 
of income decreases with increases in income.117 Similarly, a 
percentage of income order could be adjusted to accommodate 
the concerns of low-income obligors. A self-support reserve 
could be specified so that low-income obligors would not have to 
pay support until the minimum income level had been reached. 
D. Allow Automatic Adjustment of Child Support 
Despite the advantages of automatic adjustment mecha- 
nisms, however, many courts are troubled by them. This reluc- 
tance to embrace automatic adjustment stems &om the majori- 
ty view that child support should be based upon current evi- 
dence before the court, not predictions of what is probable. This 
preference for current financial information is understandable. 
However, the structural effect of the current approach deserves 
examination. 
As previously discussed, courts' rejection of automatic ad- 
justment mechanisms places the custodial parent a t  a substan- 
tial disadvantage. The custodial parent's inadequate informa- 
116. Anneberg v. Anneberg, 116 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. 1962); Stanaway v. 
Stanaway, 245 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (order invalidated because 
no maximum amount was set forth); Edwards v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 883 (Wash. 
1983) (en banc). But see Hakken v. Hakken, 298 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) 
(finding that ceilings are not required for escalator clauses). 
117. Some guidelines provide that they apply only up to a certain level of 
income. See, e.g., TEX. FM. CODE ANN. 5 14.055(c) (West Supp. 1994); Chasin v. 
Chasin, 582 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1992); Nebraska Child Supp. Guidelines para. 
0 (Jan. 1, 1990), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COUFtTS, supra note 69, at 582. 
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tion, the cost of legal action, and the vague standard for modifi- 
cation all discourage modification actions. If the award is not 
modified, inflation and the higher cost of children as they age 
force the custodial parent to bear an increasing portion of child- 
related expenses. Causing the custodial parent to bear an in- 
creasing portion of the expenses of the child seems unfair as a 
social policy, and unjustifiable unless the problems of automat- 
ic adjustment are substantial. 
Current American child support practice works great hard- 
ship on the custodial parent. Policymakers should consider 
some means of automatic adjustment to child support orders to 
avoid the necessity of subsequent judicial proceedings. Periodic 
COLA review, a t  a minimum, is needed. Expressing a child 
support order as a percentage of the obligor's income, rather 
than as a fixed amount, would also avoid later court actions. 
Because the percentage of income method focuses only on the 
obligor's income, it seems unlikely that the percentage of in- 
come approach will be accepted in states applying the income 
shares approach or the Melson approach. Also, another auto- 
matic adjustment mechanism would be needed in percentage of 
income states where the obligor is not an employee with a 
relatively stable job. In these instances, I would propose a 
COLA system.' l8 
The percentage of income method is best suited for those 
states which accept that child support should be based only on 
the obligor's income. Certain variations to the percentage of 
income approach, such as the percentage of increase method, as 
well as other possible changes to percentage of income orders 
discussed above, could remedy concerns about the obligor's 
ability to pay, hardship on low-income obligors, the custodial 
parent's need for stable payments, and the ability of the order 
to reflect the decreasing percentage of income that families 
dedicate to child support as income rises. Percentage of income 
118. There is some question whether a COLA system is permitted under feder- 
al law for orders governed by Title IV-D. When Wisconsin submitted its plan for 
child support review and adjustment, its plan incorporated a COLA option. The re- 
sponse of the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement was that child support 
orders governed by Title IV-D may only be adjusted based upon guidelines. See 
Letter from Ms. Kay Willmouth to Ms. Mary Southwick (March 24, 1994) (on file 
with the author). A "Title IV-D case" is an action to establish or enforce support 
obligations brought under the Child Support Enforcement Act, Part D of Title IV of 
the Federal Social Security Ad. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 651-669 (West 1991). 
If this construction of federal law is correct, the law should be changed. COLA 
provisions are useful and should not be barred. 
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orders apparently do not, as some courts have feared, cause 
more underemployment than fixed payment orders. Finally, 
while it creates some enforcement problems, a percentage of 
income order seems to work f&ly well for obligors whose in- 
come comes mainly from a stable job. 
E. Modification Actions Will Remain Necessary Even with 
Automatic Adjustment 
Although automatic adjustment mechanisms will to some 
extent reduce the need for post-decree modification, post-decree 
modification will remain necessary even if automatic adjust- 
ment is accepted. No automatic adjustment system addresses a 
substantial increase in the needs of the child. Also, no automat- 
ic adjustment mechanism considers what should occur if a 
parent establishes a new permanent relationship. If the guide- 
line permits a court to consider the income of a new partner or 
an  obligation to support a new partner, new relationships could 
be grounds for modification of the child support award.l19 
Some states allow modification for an obligor who assumes 
additional support obligations.'" Substantial changes in the 
visitation arrangements may also justify modification.12' Fur- 
119. Not all guidelines expressly permit, and some forbid, courts' consideration 
of the income or needs of a new partner. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. Q 518.551(5)(bX1) 
(West Supp. 1994) (not providing for this consideration, but allowing consideration 
of other factors); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. Q 14.055 (West Supp. 1994) (not providing 
for this consideration, but allowing consideration of other factors); ALASKA R. Crv. 
P. 90.3 cmt. (6)(B)(6) (1994); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 6(c)(6) (1994); id. 6(a)(4); Ariz. Child 
Supp. Gui&lines part 5(f) (Dec. 31, 1989), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS, supra note 69, at  41; Del. Child Supp. Formula part 111 (Jan. 1990), in 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, at  121. In contrast, some 
guidelines do direct courts to consider new partners. See, eg., N.D. Gukklines for 
Absent Parent Child Supp. part IV, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra 
note 69, at  710-12. See generally infia notes 158-61. 
120. Some states do not permit a court to consider such obligations incurred 
aRer the entry of the initial decree. See Judicial Council of California, Review of 
Statewide Uniform Child Support Guideline (Dec. 1993) a t  75-77. A number of oth- 
er states do permit courts to consider such children. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 
8 598.21 (West 1981); Mo. CIV. P. FORM No. 14 cmt. (Presumed Child Support 
Amount Calculation Worksheet). Under a third approach, some states do not per- 
mit an obligor to decrease child support due to subsequent children, but permit the 
obligor to present evidence of subsequent children in response to a petition to 
increase child support. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. Q 40-4-ll.l(C)(2)(e) (Michie Supp. 
1993); Colo. Child Supp. Guideline part III(B) (Sept. 1986), in NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, a t  90; Del. Child Supp. Formula Q 111 part X 
(Jan. 25, 1990), in NATIONAL CENTER M)R STATE COURTS, supm note 69, a t  124. 
121. See genemlly Marygold Melli & Patricia Brown, The Economics of Shared 
Custody: Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HOW. L. REV. 
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ther, a COLA provision will not always keep up with post-de- 
Cree increases in the obligor's income. 
A recent pilot program was conducted to study, among 
other things, the extent to which old fixed amount orders re- 
quired modification. This study found that, of the orders stud- 
ied, relatively few that were more than three years old required 
adj~stment. '~~ Of those that did, however, almost all were too 
10w.l~ The new orders were based upon the child support 
guidelines then in effect and upon each parent's current in- 
come. Of those orders that increased, the amount of the in- 
crease was significantly higher than what would have resulted 
with a COLA increase from the time of initial order? 
543 (1994). 
122. See CALIBER ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF CHILD SUPPORT REVIEW AND 
MODIFICATION DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN FOUR STATES: CROSS-SITE FINAL RE- 
PORT (1992) [hereinafter "CROSS-SITE FINAL REPORT"]. Of the orders selected, 10% 
were modified. Id. at  172. In some instances the custodial parent did not authorize 
a review of the order, so the agency could not determine whether modification was 
warranted. Id. 
123. See id. 172-73. 
124. Id. a t  180-185. In those cases where the custodial parent was receiving 
aid for dependant children, the order was increased by an average of 115%. Id. a t  
182. For non-AFDC custodial parents, the average increase was 66%. Id. This in- 
crease in all instances was higher than what would have resulted from an annual 
COLA increase from the date of the decree. For example, in Colorado the average 
increase was 67%, while a COLA provision would have resulted in an increase of 
41%, on average. Id. at  185. For Florida, the actual average increase when the 
order was modif3ed was 97%; an a ~ u a l  COLA provision would have resulted in an 
increase of 36%. Id. Finally, in Illinois the actual average increase amounted to 
114%, while an annual COLA increase would have been 30%. Id. 
These figures may to some degree reflect a "pre-guideline effect," in that the 
old orders being modified were orders entered before guidelines had been accepted 
in these states. Therefore, it is instructive to consider the data from Delaware, 
which had accepted guidelines in 1979. The investigators found that, when post- 
1979 Delaware orders were reviewed, of those modified the average increase was 
60'30, compared to an increase of 27% that would have resulted from an annual 
COLA increase. Id.; see also CALIBER ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
REVIEW AND MODIFICATION DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN FOUR STATES: DELAWARE 
FINAL REPORT IV-68 (1992). (The number of children involved did not significantly 
change between the date of the original order and the modification. Id. at  IV-67- 
68.) When comparing the Delaware findings with those from Illinois and Florida, i t  
appears that the findings from these states may reflect a "pre-guideline effect" 
which artificially increases the difference between the COLA and the actual modifi- 
cation. For example, Delaware orders entered before 1979 were increased an aver- 
age amount of 74%, compared to the 6Wo finding regarding post-1979 orders. Id. at  
IV-76. Still, the Delaware findings regarding post-1979 orders suggest that annual 
COLA increases will not be adequate for all cases, even where the initial order is 
calculated based upon a guideline. 
For further discussion of this pilot project and its findings, see infia notes 186- 
190 and accompanying text. 
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Depending upon the automatic adjustment mechanism 
chosen, other situations would necessitate a modification. For 
example, even a COLA system requires modification if the ob- 
ligor is laid off or if his income substantially changes. This 
would not be true if the child support is expressed as a percent- 
age of the obligor's income, but would be if the order was a 
percentage of increase order. If no automatic adjustment sys- 
tem is accepted, the need for modification would be even more 
pressing. 
IV. NEW IDEAS REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION 
In most states, a child support order is expressed as a fixed 
amount, subject to modification only upon a substantial and 
unforeseen change of circ~mstances. '~~ As stated in the intro- 
duction, the custodial parent must assess her chances in a 
modification action without information about the obligor's fi- 
nancial situation or he lpN guidance in understanding what 
comprises a substantial change in circumstances. Although 
allowing automatic adjustment of child support will reduce the 
importance of modification for some parents, modification will 
still be needed in some instances. The continuing need to allow 
child support modification requires new ideas to better remedy 
the problems facing custodial parents. In this part, I recom- 
mend a number of relatively simple changes to remedy these 
defects and to improve the system governing modification of 
child support. 
A. Information Exchange 
Few states today make any effort to provide a parent with 
information about post-decree changes in the financial condi- 
tion of the other parent.'26 Even if a parent is willing to de- 
vote the resources to pursue a modification proceeding, a par- 
ent still has little information to determine whether it would be 
wise to initiate a modification proceeding. It seems likely that 
this lack of information more often than not works to the disad- 
vantage of the custodial parent. If the custodial parent does not 
125. See, e.g., Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); 
Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 675 Wyo. 1985). See generally CLARK, supra 
note 10, at 727. 
126. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. $ 14-10-115(3)(b)(II) West Supp. 1993) (providing 
that a court may, if it wishes, require an annual exchange of financial informa- 
tion). 
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learn of any significant raises received by the other parent, the 
custodial parent may well defer or never initiate an action to 
increase child support, even though the action would have been 
successful. Of course, the lack of information could have the 
opposite effect if the custodial parent's income has significantly 
increased and the other parent is unaware of this change. 
Some means should be found to provide an accurate period- 
ic exchange of information between parents. One simple way of 
doing this would be t o  require a parent to send a copy of his or 
her tax return to the other parent by May 1 of each year. Such 
a procedure would be less than perfect. Some parents never fde 
tax returns. Even if they do, there is no guarantee that the tax 
return is truthful. Also, if the parent has remarried and filed a 
joint return, the information would not be as useful, because 
the income of a new spouse is not generally included in the 
guideline calculation. Still, such a procedure in many instances 
could give the other parent at least a rough idea of the finan- 
cial condition of the other spouse. Also, tax returns include 
information about things other than wages that could be rele- 
vant to a child support determination, such as interest, rents, 
investment income, royalties and capital gains.12? This pro- 
posed disclosure procedure would require no direct governmen- 
tal involvement. Also, it would not require the parties to draft 
an additional disclosure document; they merely would have t o  
copy a document already being created for another purpose. To 
verify the accuracy of the information exchanged, spouses could 
be asked to  forward a copy of the most recent W-2, as well as 
the most recent pay stub (if the parent is a salaried employee). 
B. Establish Objective Standards for Child 
Support Modification 
Despite the pressing need for child support modification 
where, as is customary today, child support is expressed as a 
fured amount and is not automatically adjusted, most states 
provide little guidance as to  the meaning of the stan- 
dard-substantial change of circumstances-that generally 
127. Some guidelines include investment income and royalties as income when 
computing the presumptive child support obligation. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
$ 458-C:2(IV) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 3113.215(&(2) (Supp. 1993); 231 PA. 
CODE $ 1910.16-5 (Supp. 1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. $ 14.05300) (West Supp. 
1994). 
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governs child support modification.lz8 To better provide guid- 
ance to parties and courts alike, I propose that child support 
guidelines be applied to child support modification actions as 
well as to initial awards, and that an objective standard should 
be established for what constitutes a substantial change in  
circumstances. 
1. The tension between discretion and rules 
Courts wisely recognize the need for judicial discretion to 
consider all relevant factors before modifying child support 
obligations, but the current breadth of discretion in modifica- 
tion decisions makes outcomes unpredictable. The results par- 
allel the unpredictability of initial awards under the traditional 
pre-guideline system of substantial d iscret i~n. '~~ To create 
additional certainty in this area, some states have established, 
by presumptive rules, an objective standard of what constitutes 
a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. For exam- 
ple, some states have adopted a policy that there presumptively 
is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties if, at 
the time the parent petitions a court, a child support award 
computed under the current guidelines, based upon the current 
income of the parties, would deviate by more than a certain 
specified percentage from the amount of the initial award.lsO 
Would it be wise to create an  objective standard regarding 
child support modification? The appropriate balance between 
fixed rules and dis~retion'~' has been a recurring theme in 
Anglo-American law.ls2 Family law commentators have also 
-- 
128. See generally CLARK, supra note 10, at  727. 
129. See generally K e ~ e t h  R. White & R. Thomas Stone, Jr., A Study of Mi- 
mony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75, 
83 (1976); Lucy M. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empiri- 
cal Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver 
District Court, 57 DEN. L.J. 21, 28-30, 52-55 (1979). 
130. See IND. CODE $ 31-1-11.5-17(a) (Bunis Supp. 1994) (requiring that the 
new amount deviate by 20% from the existing order); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
$ 403.2 13(2) (MichieBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (specifying 15%); In re Marriage of 
hgliese, 761 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (determining that if the child 
support as  calculated under the current guideline differs from the current order by 
a t  least lo%, there presumptively has been a change of circumstances); Mullin v. 
Mullin, 612 A.2d 796, 798-99 (COM. App. Ct. 1992) (specifying 15%). 
131. Bofessor Sullivan refers to this distinction as one between rules and 
standards. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules an& 
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 57-58 (1992). 
132. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (1969); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING RY THE RULES (1991); THE USES OF 
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considered the issue.'= Advocates of rules contend that they 
force decisionmakers to treat like cases alike, thereby reducing 
arbitrariness or bias? One response t o  this view is that 
rules cannot always consider all relevant factors, so that in fact 
like cases are not treated alike.ls5 So, in Professor Sullivan's 
view, "a decision favoring rules thus reflects the judgment that 
the danger of unfairness from official arbitrariness or bias is 
greater than the danger from the arbitrariness that flows from 
the grossness of rules."ls6 
Aside from the relative arbitrariness of rules or discretion, 
another relevant concern pertains to  the transaction costs of 
each. Proponents of rules argue that, due to  the predictability 
resulting from rules, litigation costs are reduced and settlement 
is facilitated. 13' 
A rule is a relatively rigid regulatory mechanism. In theo- 
ry, rules are mechanically applied. A legislative amendment is 
necessary to change a rule embodied in a statute. In contrast, a 
system permitting substantial discretion is more flexible and 
can adapt t o  changing social needs without action by the cre- 
ator of the rule. For this reason, a discretionary system can 
react more quickly to social change and facilitate creativity.ls8 
A choice between rules and discretion may also involve a 
choice of the appropriate decisionmaker. If rules are promulgat- 
ed by the legislature, the legislature is permitted t o  make the 
important policy choices, whereas a policy of discretion normal- 
ly allows judges to  make such choices.'3g The relative desir- 
ability of rules may then depend upon whether a certain policy 
choice seems more appropriately delegated t o  judges o r  
legislators. 140 
DISCRETION (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standurds, 33 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 379 (1985). 
133. See Mary AM Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in  Contemporary Fam- 
ily Law and Succession Law, 60 RJL. L. REV. 1165 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, Dis- 
cretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991). 
134. See Duncan K e ~ e d y ,  Form and Substance. in  Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HAW. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of 
Rules, 56 U .  CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1989); Sullivan, supra note 131, at 62. 
135. See Sullivan, supra note 131, at 62, 66. 
136. Id. at 62. 
137. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice 
in  Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 223 (1991). 
138. See generally DAVIS, supra note 132, at 25. 
139. See Sullivan, supra note 131, at 64. 
140. See generally Homer Clark, The Role of the Court and Legislature i n  ths 
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Framing the choice in terms of a choice between "rules" or 
"discretion" is to some degree artificial. I t  is quite rare to en- 
counter a regulatory scheme that is a "pure" rule or permits 
unfettered discretion; most policies are compromises that fall 
somewhere between those two extremes.l4l The challenge for 
those formulating policy is to decide upon the optimal balance 
between rules and discretion for a given 
Judges traditionally have possessed a great deal of discre- 
tion under American family law. During the past few decades, 
some family law writers have advocated various limitations 
upon this discretion.'" Although the relevant factors depend 
upon the issue presented, many concerns recur when consider- 
ing the appropriate balance between rules and discretion re- 
garding family law policy choices. Proponents of discretion in  
family law matters emphasize the individualized justice that is 
thereby possible.lu This obviously is an important concern 
regarding an issue such as child support; many factors not 
incorporated into guideline computation could be relevant to a 
determination of an appropriate amount of child support, such 
as any special needs of a child or, if a parent has remarried, 
the income or needs of the new partner or any subsequent 
children. Critics note, however, that a system of discretion has 
a number of costs. First, results are more difficult to predict, so 
early settlement is discouraged and litigation costs are in- 
~reased."~ Also, judgments based upon discretion are based 
in part upon the judge's personal beliefs and biases, so a discre- 
tionary system yields inconsistent results. Finally, some con- 
Growth of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 699 (1989). 
141. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discre- 
tion in Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993). 
142. See generally DAVIS, supra note 132, at  3-4. 
143. See generally Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest 
of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36-43 (1987) (child custody); Glendon, supra 
note 133, at 1181-82 (child custody); Ramsay L. KlafT, The Tender Years Doctrine: 
A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 357-58 (1982) (child custody); Robert H. Mnookin, 
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at  226, 262 (child custody); Murphy, supra 
note 137 (child support rules); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 
67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1119 (1989) (alimony rules). Cf. John W. Ester, Maryland 
Custody Law-Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interest?, 41 MD. L. REV. 225, 
250 (1982) (advocating discretion in child custody decisions); Schneider, supm note 
133 (discussing the pros and cons of discretion and rules in child custody deci- 
sions). 
144. See Schneider, supra note 141, at  234-35. 
145. See Glendon, supra note 133. 
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tend that judges are biased toward men and are uninformed 
about the costs of children, so a system of judicial discretion 
results in discrimination against custodial mothers. 
The acceptance of child support guidelines during the past 
decade reflects a judgment that, a t  least for child support, 
regulatory policy should shift more toward rules and away from 
discretion. Guidelines now clearly apply in all states as pre- 
sumptive standards for an initial award of child support. An 
argument could be made that the payment schedule for child 
support should be specified when the decree is entered, and 
that this schedule normally should not be m~dified."~ In my 
discussion above, though, I outlined the deficiencies of such a 
scheme and concluded that the optimal child support system 
should adjust to any signifcant post-decree changes in the 
parties' ~ircumstances.'~' This conclusion, one that is to some 
degree accepted by the American rule, does not seem too con- 
troversial. Given this conclusion, the question thus becomes 
how to adapt child support awards to post-decree changes in 
circumstances. Given the acceptance of guidelines regarding 
initial awards, these guidelines seem an obvious potential 
mechanism for updating child support awards. 
2. Apply child support guidelines to modification actions 
If one wishes to integrate guidelines into the modification 
process, a number of different options are possible regarding 
the current system of modifying a child support order ex- 
pressed as a fixed amount. For example, a state in which 
guidelines govern modifications as well as initial orders could 
abandon the "substantial change of circumstances" concept, and 
permit a parent to file a modification action whenever he or she 
chooses. The child support would be recomputed based upon 
the parties' financial situation a t  that time. Wisely, few states 
have accepted this approach.'" One fairly obvious benefit of 
146. See supra part II.B.5. 
, 147. Id. 
148. Washington apparently does permit a modification action without a show- 
ing of a substantial change in circumstances if the order has not been modified 
within two years. See WASH. REV. CODE 5 26.09.170(8) (West Supp. 1994). Dela- 
ware permits a modification if the child support award would be changed by $25. 
See DeZ. Child Supp. Formula part X (Jan. 1990), in NATIONAL CENTER M)R STATE 
COURTS, supra note 69, at 124. In Massachusetts, as of 1994, child support orders 
may be modified if the order is inconsistent with the guidelines. An Ad to Im- 
prove the Economic Security of Children of the Commonwealth, 1993 Mass. Ads 
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the "substantial change of circumstances" rule is that it at- 
tempts to balance the costs of the modification proceeding 
against the resulting benefit. In view of the legal and emotional 
costs of a modification action, as well as the concomitant bur- 
den upon courts, it seems wise to place some reasonable limits 
upon a parent's right to initiate a modification action. 
3. Possible limitations on modification act ions 
A number of possible limits to modification actions are 
available. One alternative would be to limit the frequency of 
modification actions. For example, a parent could be barred 
from initiating a modification action for two years after any 
support action; some exception would be necessary for extreme 
hardship.14g In my view, though, a modification rule based 
upon time focuses upon the wrong factor. 
Another alternative would be to use the guidelines as an 
objective standard of substantial change of circumstances. 
Since guidelines focus upon the income of one or both parents, 
they indirectly address changes in the parents' situations. 
Guidelines can provide an objective standard for child support 
modification actions by equating substantial change of circum- 
stances with a deviation beyond a specified percentage between 
the original child support award and the amount that would 
currently be awarded under the guidelines. The exact percent- 
age chosen would depend upon the judgment made about what 
is the appropriate balance between updating awards and judi- 
cial economy. Some precedent exists for choosing 10 per- 
cent,150 l 1  2 0 % ~ ' ~ ~  or If the presumptive 
award would deviate from the current order by at least the 
prescribed amount, the modification action would be permit- 
ted? Of course, under such a system the moving party could 
ch. 460 (amending MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 119A, $8 1 & 13; id. ch. 208, $8 28 
and 28A West 1994)). 
149. A similar approach has been adopted in a few states. See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE 8 26.09.170 (West Supp. 1994) (permitting a child support modification 
without showing a change in circumstances if the order has not been modified 
within the previous 24 months, but requiring such a showing if the decree has 
been modified within the last 24 months). 
150. See In re Marriage of Pugliese, 761 P.2d 277 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
151. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 8 660(b) (Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
8 403.213(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). 
152. IND. CODE ANN. 8 31-1-11.5-17 (Burns Supp. 1994). 
153. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 62A-11-320.5(3) (1993). 
154. It is unclear how such a system would deal with a situation where the 
8411 ABATING THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY 875 
still establish a substantial change in circumstances by other 
means, such as by showing a substantial change in the child's 
needs. 
The objective standard for what constitutes a substantial 
change in circumstances should only create a rebuttable pre- 
sumption that such a change has occurred. Therefore, if cir- 
cumstances initially justified a deviation from the guidelines at 
the time of the entry of the order, and those circumstances 
remain unchanged, the presumption would be rebutted despite 
the deviation. Similarly, circumstances that now justify a devi- 
ation from the guidelines will rebut the presumption even if 
the initial order was based upon the guidelines.ls5 
This proposed objective standard for what constitutes a 
substantial change in circumstances might permit more modifi- 
cation actions than the current substantial change in circum- 
stances standard, thereby potentially increasing court case- 
loads. Of course, because my proposed standard clearly estab- 
lishes what needs to be shown to presumptively be able to 
obtain a modification of the order, such an objective standard 
could reduce judicial caseload by both reducing unsuccessful 
filings and by encouraging settlement where modification is 
indicated. Even if this proposed standard for modification 
would increase judicial caseloads such a result should not cause 
this alternative regime to be rejected. First, a number of meth- 
ods exist for easing burdens imposed on courts as a result of 
child support modification actions. One example is New 
Jersey's system of hiring "hearing officers," supervised by j udg- 
es, who hear almost all modification actions. The result pro- 
posed by the hearing officer is then forwarded to the judge for 
final approval.156 Also, even if judicial caseloads will be in- 
creased by the standard I suggested above, this cost should not 
outweigh the societal benefits of updating child support orders 
to  reflect the parents' current circumstances. 
non-custodial parent was not initially ordered to pay any support, and the modifi- 
cation action is to obtain some support. For an example of a court dealing with 
this issue under the traditional rule, see S.A.B.S. v. H.B., 767 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
155. For example, under current law in many states, if the obligor had remar- 
ried and fathered another child, this could cause a court in many states not to 
grant an increase in child support, even if the obligor's income had significantly in- 
creased. See infra notes 157-163 and accompanying text. 
156. Interview with Raymond Rainvill, New Jersey Administrative Office of 
Courts (May 9, 1994). 
876 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSIW LAW REVIEW [I994 
4. Address other foreseeable changes of circumstances in the 
guide1 ines 
Guidelines will be less useful in modification actions if 
they do not address what should occur if either parent remar- 
ries or assumes responsibility for other children.15' An in- 
creasing number of guidelines do address such problems. For 
example, of the 23 states whose guidelines discuss what should 
occur if a parent establishes a new significant relationship, 
about one-half allow courts to consider the income of the new 
partner, while the other one-half forbid it.'" Many guidelines 
specify how courts should calculate a child support award if the 
obligor establishes a parent-child relationship with a new 
child.lSg Some do not permit a downward modification based 
upon subsequent children of the obligor.lBO Others do permit 
a downward modification, and specify how the calculation 
should be done? Others allow a downward modification, but 
give the court discretion regarding the amount of the appropri- 
ate reduction.lB2 To the extent that the respective guideline 
157. Divorced people frequently remarry. See generally Oldham, supra note 30. 
158. See generally Judicial Council of California, supra note 89, at  74-75. For 
example, some forbid the court from considering evidence of the income of the 
obligor's new spouse for any purpose. See, e.g., Stark v. Nelson, 878 S.W.2d 302 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994). In contrast, others do not include the new spouse's income in 
the formula, but permit the court to consider the effect of the new spouse's income 
on the obligor's living expenses. See, eg., N.D. Dakota Guidelines for Parent Child 
Supp. para. IV, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, at 711. 
The approach accepted by a state regarding this issue would be affected by 
whether a stepparent has an obligation to support the child of his or her spouse. 
Most states do not impose such an obligation. See Marygold S. Melli & Ann M. 
Stanton, The Child Support Obligation 11-37, ch. 11 in 1 ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT 
& COUNSEL FEES-AWARD, MODIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Matthew Bender); 
Duffey v. Duffey, 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1154 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). Some do im- 
pose this support duty on stepparents. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 25-7-8 
(1992); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 574 A.2d 772 (Vt. 1990). 
159. Judicial Council of California, supra note 89, at 75-77. 
160. Id.; see, eg., Del. Child Supp. Formula part I11 (Jan. 1990), in NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, at 121. 
161. See, e.g., TEX. F M .  CODE 8 14.055Q) (West Supp. 1994). Generally the 
amount of a hypothetical child support order for the child, based upon the guide- 
lines, is subtracted from the obligor's income before arriving at  the obligor's income 
for purposes of the guideline calculation. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
3 3113.215 (Supp. 1993); OR. ADMIN. R. 137-50-400 (1989), in NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, a t  759; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 5 14.053(b) (West 
Supp. 1994). 
162. See, e.g., CAL. F M .  CODE $5 4059(8), 4071(a)(2), 4071(b) (granting the 
court discretion regarding the amount, if any, by which the support should be 
reduced in this situation). 
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does not clearly specify how to treat these common post-decree 
changes in the parties' lives, the parties will not be able to 
predict the outcome of any contemplated modification action, 
thereby reducing the utility of guidelines in these situa- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  
5. Modifying orders entered before guidelines were 
promulgated 
One might argue that child support decrees entered before 
the acceptance of guidelines constitute a different regime, and 
therefore, the guidelines should not govern their modifica- 
tion;'@ in other words, guidelines should not be given retroac- 
tive effect. The acceptance of guidelines reflects a policy judg- 
ment that standards for the computation of child support need 
to be clearer and the amounts need to be higher. Using guide- 
lines as a standard for modification would facilitate the realiza- 
tion of these important goals.'65 
Some contend, however, that divorce financial settlements 
negotiated before the adoption of guidelines were negotiated in 
a different 'legal environment," and the application of guide- 
lines would be unfair.16' This point raises the question 
whether before the adoption of guidelines parties addressed 
lower child support awards via other means. I t  is possible that 
in some instances, due to the lower child support award, a 
judge might have ordered more spousal support than would 
have resulted a t  a higher level of child support. In such in- 
stances, it would be unfair to award the recipient both the 
amount of spousal support based upon the lower amount of 
child support and to increase the child support. I t  is unclear 
how often this might have occurred. Relatively few spouses 
receive spousal support, and those who do generally receive it 
163. See, eg., In re Marriage of Ladely, 469 N.W.2d 663, 665-66 (Iowa 1991) 
(providing little guidance to lower courts regarding how to respond when the obli- 
gor has additional children); see also In re Marriage of Linberg, 462 N.W.2d 698, 
701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (opining that trial courts could "consider" the income of a 
stepparent). 
164. See generally Peter Leehy, Note, Child Support Standards Act and the 
New York Jzdiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent Solution, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 
1336 (1991). 
165. For example, New Zealand applies its new child support system to all 
orders, even those entered before the new regime was adopted. See W.R. Atkin, 
Child Support in New Zealand Runs into Strife, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 631 (1994) 
(forthcoming). 
166. Leehy, supra note 164, a t  1337. 
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for a short period.'" Even if the spousal support amount was 
inflated to  compensate for a lower pre-guideline child support 
amount, the spousal support normally would have stopped by 
the time the custodial parent requests modification. Applying 
guidelines to the modification of pre-guideline orders would 
therefore result in hardship to few obligors. Also, if the spousal 
support level was established in a settlement agreement, fre- 
quently such agreements provide that, if child support is in- 
creased, spousal support will be decreased. In this situation, 
increasing child support therefore would have little effect. 
Another objection to applying the guidelines to the modifi- 
cation of pre-guideline orders is that the obligor may have 
made concessions in the property division in exchange for a 
lower child support obligation. Applying the guidelines in this 
situation could be unfair to the obligor, requiring him to pay 
child support twice. Since many divorcing couples have little 
pr~perty, '~' this concern is of limited scope. Many states 
therefore apply guidelines retroactively to all modification ac- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  Any unfairness can be resolved on an individual ba- 
sis. 170 
Child support orders entered before the adoption of guide- 
lines generally are lower than orders entered after guidelines 
were adopted. These obligors may have incurred other obliga- 
tions when the award was lower, and could experience hard- 
ship if the initial order is significantly increased. If it would be 
difficult to bear the entire increase at once, it could be imple- 
mented in steps. 
In summ&, an objective standard for child support modi- 
fication would provide benefits to the parties. Both the parties 
167. See generally Marsha Garrison, Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules. 
Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Herma Kay & Stephen 
Sugarman eds., 1990); Robert McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform 
and Its Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443, 473, 474-75 (1982); James B. McLindon, 
Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 
21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social 
and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1221 (1981). 
168. See Weitzman, supra note 167, at 1188. 
169. Some states' guidelines provide that the adoption of the guidelines by 
itself constituted a substantial change in circumstances, so every order entered 
before the promulgation of guidelines could be automatically adjusted. See, e-g., 
1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1088, 8 6 ("The enactment of subsection 1 of section 598.41 
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances authorizing a court to modify a 
child custody order pursuant to section 598.21 and chapter 598A."). 
170. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 8 25-7-6.10 (1992). 
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and the judge would better understand when modification is 
proper. In contrast, the current system's subjectivity leads to 
less predictability in determining whether a substantial change 
has occurred. The objective standard would also remedy the 
problem of a scanty record in the original support order. Under 
the current system, the absence of evidence in the record of the 
circumstances a t  the time makes proof of change of circum- 
stances almost imp~ssible.~" An objective standard would al- 
so limit litigation to those cases in which one party would be 
substantially benefitted. This limitation would lead to an ef- 
ficient use of court time as less time would be allocated to un- 
successful modifications. An objective standard would also lead 
to more consistent results. Finally, it should induce parents to 
initiate more modification actions where the action is warrant- 
ed. 
This discussion assumes that the current regime of child 
support expressed in fmed amounts will continue for the fore- 
seeable future in most states. If percentage of income orders 
are accepted, of course, modification presumably would be 
needed less frequently. Also, because orders expressed as a 
percentage of income automatically adjust when the obligor's 
income changes, a hypothetical child support order based upon 
the parties' current circumstances would less frequently deviate 
from the currently effective order amount by the specified mini- 
mum percentage to just* an  adjustment. 
C. Provide Only Limited Automatic Periodic 
Review and Adjustment 
The American rule's failure to allow for automatic adjust- 
ment leads some to contend orders should be reviewed auto- 
matically and periodically. Indeed, Congress has mandated that 
custodial parents should be informed every three years of their 
right to attempt to modify the applicable child support or- 
der.lT2 Orders affecting a parent receiving Aid for Families 
with Dependent Children (hereafter "AFDC") must be reviewed 
once every three years, unless the review would not be in the 
best interests of the child. lT3 
171. See, e.g., S.A.B.S. v. H.B., 767 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
172. See genemlly Family Support Ad of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 
243 (1988); 45 C.F.R. $$ 302, 303, 303.7, 303.8 (1993). This automatic review every 
three years has been enaded by certain states as well. See, e.g., 43 OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 43, $ 118.1 (West 1990). 
173. Family Support Act of 1988, supm note 172; see also 42 U.S.C. 
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In an attempt to learn more about the costs and benefits of 
an  automatic periodic review program, Congress funded pilot 
programs in four states.'" In these programs, custodial par- 
ents whose orders were at least approximately three years old 
were randomly selected. These parents were then contacted 
and informed that  they could have their order reviewed for 
possible modification. 
This pilot project led to two surprising findings. First, a 
significant number of custodial parents did not want the order 
revie~ed. '?~ When contacted, parents gave a number of rea- 
sons for declining review. Some explanations were not surpris- 
ing. For example, some parents were not receiving any child 
support, and felt a review of the order would be not be useful. 
Others were reluctant to go to court, or felt that the obligor 
was paying all he could afford.'?? Other explanations were 
not as obvious. In a few states, a surprising number of parents 
did not consent to a review because they did not want to under- 
mine what they felt was a good relationship with the obli- 
g ~ r . ' ~ ~  If the relationship were undermined, the custodial par- 
ent was concerned that the obligor would be less reliable re- 
garding the payment of child support. Other parents were con- 
cerned that the child support order would be decreased, not 
increased. ' 79 
Another finding is related to the first. Of the cases selected 
where the parent was not receiving AFDC, a surprisingly small 
percentage of the orders were modified.1s0 Although this may 
result in part from the low rate of consent to the review pro- 
cess, the percentage of orders modified among AFDC recipients 
0 666(a)(lO)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988). 
174. The states were Florida, Illinois, Delaware and Colorado. See CROSS-SITE 
FINAL REPORT, supm note 122. 
175. Parents receiving AFDC benefits had to consent to the review; other par- 
ents could choose whether to participate. Id. 
176. Id. at 128-44. Of custodial parents contacted, almost threequarters of all 
cases selected were terminated before a full review of the order. Of these terminat- 
ed cases, 45% were terminated because the custodial parent did not authorize the 
review. Id. at 135. (Those parents not receiving AFDC benefits had to consent to a 
review of the order.) Of those parents not receiving AFDC benefits, only 15% of all 
cases selected received a full review. Id. at 144. 
177. Id. at 229. 
178. Id. at 232. 
179. Id. at 236. Custodial parents had to consent to the review before the 
agency had sufficient financial information to calculate a new presumptive amount. 
180. Orders in six percent of all non-AFDC cases selected were modified. Id. at  
vi. 
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was not significantly higher even though they were required to 
consent.'" Even among non-AFDC custodial parents con- 
senting to review, a full review of financial information was 
often unnecessary because the youngest child had become 
emancipated, the obligor was dead, no enforceable order exist- 
ed, the agency could not locate a parent, or the need for modifi- 
cation was otherwise obviously foreclosed. lS2 
In some circumstances, of course, cases were modified. The 
orders in 85% of those AFDC cases receiving a full review were 
increased, were reduced in 5%, and remained unchanged in the 
remaining ~ases. ' '~ The result for parents not receiving 
AFDC benefits was lower; 77% of all such orders were in- 
creased, 8% were lowered, and 15% remained unchanged.'* 
Although only about 10% of all cases selectedlS5 resulted in 
modificati~n,"~ the modification was significant when it oc- 
curred. Of parents with AFDC benefits, the order, when modi- 
fied, was increased an average of 115%.'87 Of parents not re- 
ceiving AFDC, the average increase amounted to 66%.18' 
These amounts were sigmficantly higher than what would have 
occurred with COLA increases from the date of the order.'" 
The correlation was positive between the age of the order and 
the percentage increase.'s0 
The pilot project findings cast some doubt upon the wisdom 
of automatic review of support orders at certain prescribed 
intervals. Substantial effort was expended to modify a relative- 
ly small percentage of orders reviewed. If one of the automatic 
adjustment mechanisms suggested abovelgl had been em- 
ployed in the initial orders, even a smaller percentage presum- 
ably would have been modified. I would argue that, if an  auto- 
matic adjustment mechanism for support is accepted, periodic 
review of all orders should not be automatic. In view of the 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at iv, 136. 
183. Id. at 147. 
184. Id. at 148. 
185. Remember that most cases selected did not result in a review. See supra 
note 176 and accompanying text. 
186. CROSS-SITE FINAL REPORT, supra note 122, at vi. Fifteen percent of all 
AFDC cases were modified, compared to six percent of non-AFDC cases. 
187. Id. at 182. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 185. 
190. Id. 
191. See supra part 111. 
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higher rate of m ~ ~ c a t i o n  btained in cases involving AFDC 
cases,lg2 the greater governmental expenditures regarding 
such families, and the lower incentive such custodial parents 
have to attempt to modify child support,1s3 it may be sensible 
to  continue the current practice of mandatory review of such 
orders every three years. For all other orders, it should be 
sufficient if the state would hire sufficient personnel so that 
either parent could call and request the employee to calculate 
the presumptive child support amount that would result based 
upon the parents' current financial information.lS4 If the state 
adopts an objective standard for a substantial change in cir- 
cumstances, as suggested above,lg5 the parent should then be 
fairly certain whether modification would be possible, and 
could act accordingly. 
D. Allow Contractual Limitations on the Right to 
Post-Decree Modification 
When discussing modification, the preceding section as- 
sumed that the initial child support order normally is calculat- 
ed pursuant to  the guidelines. This may not always be true; 
child support could deviate from the guidelines due to other 
aspects of the parties' financial settlement. For example, the 
obligor may be willing to make certain concessions regarding 
the property division, or may allow the custodial parent t o  live 
in the marital home, in exchange for a lower child support 
award than that set forth in the g~idelines.'~~ In such a situ- 
ation, if the custodial parent would have the right shortly after 
the agreement is finalized to modify the child support order 
based upon the guidelines, this type of bargaining would not 
OCCUT. lg7 
192. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
193. Any increase in child support normally is retained by the government as 
reimbursement for AFDC benefits provided. 
194. I proposed above one way that parties could exchange financial informa- 
tion annually. See supra part N.A. Once parties have this information, computer 
soRware exists in most states to compute the presumptive amount of child support 
due. See Raggio & Harhai, Tools of the Trade, 15 FAM. ADV. 6, 8 (1993). 
195. See supra note 171 and surrounding text. 
196. For example, the spouses made such an agreement in Kelley v. Kelley, 20 
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1554 (Va. 1994). This type of bargaining is discussed in Atkin, 
supra note 165. 
197. I t  currently is unclear whether many states now enforce contractual re- 
strictions upon child support modification. See, e.g., Elliott L. Epstein, The Enforce- 
ability of Extra-statutory and Repudiated Divorce Settlement Agreements, 8 ME. B.J. 
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This bargaining option could be preserved by allowing the 
parties to enter into enforceable contractual limitations upon 
the right to modify the child support award. Still, enforcing 
waivers of modification could negatively affect the children, 
especially if the waiver rule allowed no exceptions. 
Some courts have been skeptical of attempts by spouses to 
limit the ability of a court t o  modify child support due to a 
party's change in circumstances. Indeed, a number of opinions 
hold that parents may not limit a court's ability to modify child 
support.198 These courts seem concerned about the possible 
negative effects of such agreements upon the well-being of 
children. One judge stated that "[tlhe support of one's children 
is not a proper area for long-term economic gambling, and the 
courts will not enforce the parties' attempts to engage in such 
spec~lation."'~~ 
144 (May 1993) (opining that a Maine court would not enforce such an agreement). 
See also cases cited infra note 198. Some European countries have been more fa- 
vorably disposed toward such agreements. See Marie-Th6rhse Meulders-Klein, Fi- 
nancial Agreements on Divorce and the Freedom of Contract in Continental Europe, 
ch. 18 in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 297 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford 
N. Katz eds., 1984). Australia permits limitations upon child support modification, 
while New Zealand does not. See Atkin, supra note 165. 
198. See, e.g., Ex parte Alabama, 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1112 (Ala. 1993) 
(stating that a waiver of a right to child support would not be enforced); Guille v. 
Guille, 492 A.2d 175 (Corn. 1985) (refusing to enforce decree stating that child 
support was not modifiable); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 568 A.2d 1157, 1162-63 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Mora v. Mora, 861 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that parties may not by agreement relieve one parent of future support obligation 
without court approval); Brenneman v. B r e ~ e m a n ,  No. WD-90-33, 1991 WL 49998 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of Wood, 806 P.2d 722, 723 (Or. Ct. App. 
1990) (allowing husband's action for child support despite wife's unfavorable proper- 
ty settlement and husband's waiver of any right to support); Hill v. Hill, 819 
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Pettit v. Pettit, 818 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1991); Huckeby v. Lawdermilk, 709 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Duke v. 
Duke, 448 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Grimes v. Grimes, 621 A.2d 211 
(Vt. 1992) (concluding that waiver of a right to modify should be unenforceable 
even where the obligor is trying to reduce child support); Pauley v. Pauley, 263 
S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1980) (allowing action for child support despite lump-sum pay- 
ment at  divorce and custodial parent's waiver of any additional right to support); 
Kelley v. Kelley, 20 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1554 (Va. 1994). In contrast, a few courts 
have upheld contractual limits to modification. See Ruhe v. Rowland, 706 S.W.2d 
709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
One Texas case has held that, if parties establish a child support obligation in 
a settlement agreement, if the child support is reduced in a modification action the 
custodial parent may sue based on the contract and obtain the originally specified 
amount. Hill, 819 S.W.2d at 571. However, if the child support is increased, the 
obligor may not sue the custodial parent for the difference between the originally 
specified amount and the increased amount. Id. at  572. 
199. Hill, 819 S.W.2d at 572. 
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The hazards of limiting child support modification are 
clear. In the event that the circumstances of a t  least one of the 
parties changed in a substantial and unforeseeable way, disal- 
lowing modification could prove disastrous. For example, if the 
obligor was laid off or if the child incurred some substantial 
new unforeseen expense, modification would clearly be appro- 
priate, regardless of the parties' agreement. Similarly, modifi- 
cation should be allowed if there is a change of custody. Still, 
some significant benefits could exist if parties are permitted to 
bargain about child support and its modifiability. Can these 
benefits be achieved without unreasonably risking the ability of 
the system to adjust to future unforeseen circumstances? 
If one wished to give parties flexibility to bargain regard- 
ing property division and child support, as well as its 
modifiability, while trying to protect a party who experiences a 
substantial unforeseen change in circumstances, some distinc- 
tion could be made between those events in the future that are 
not surprising or particularly unforeseeable, such as gradual 
salary raises or increases in the cost of a child as he ages, and 
other changes that are less foreseeable, such as illness, loss of 
a job, or a substantial unforeseen increase in the expenses 
related to a child. A waiver of a right to modify would be en- 
forceable in the former circumstance, but not in the latter. 
Alternatively, parties could be permitted to make an agreement 
that would bind them for a certain period of time, such as five 
years; after that period, either party could then request a modi- 
fication due to a substantial change in circumstances. Also, in 
the event of a custody change (or a substantial modification of 
the visitation arrangement), modification would be necessary. 
The desirability of bargaining regarding below-guideline 
child support rests upon the assumption that the custodial 
parent would receive some financial benefit for accepting lower 
child support. If restrictions on child support modification are 
permitted, and the child support is lower than the guideline 
amount, before accepting the agreement judges should verify 
that the ag-reementhms freely made &d that the custodial 
parent received some substantial economic concession for the 
agreement to lower child support or limit its modifiability. A 
waiver of visitation rights would not constitute such an eco- 
nomic benefit. Bargaining regarding child support and its 
modifiability could be abused. Courts certainly should not ap- 
prove such a waiver unless the custodial parent has obtained a 
significant economic concession from the other parent. 
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E. Recognize Tax Planning Strategies in 
Modification Decisions 
After divorce, the tax consequences of payments from one 
former spouse to the other depend upon whether the payment 
is considered child support or spousal support. The latter is 
taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payor, while the 
former has no tax consequence.200 If the non-custodial parent 
is in a significantly higher marginal tax bracket than the custo- 
dial parent, spouses frequently agree to pay a higher amount of 
g'alimony." Although in some instances the total amount is 
designated alimony, it often is, in reality, the sum of child 
support and whatever the obligor is paying as spousal sup- 
port.201 
Any rule regarding child support modification must reflect 
an awareness of these negotiations between spouses and should 
not foreclose them. If spouses have agreed to designate transfer 
payments as "alimony," not child support, a blind application of 
the modification rule proposed above could permit a custodial 
parent to petition for "child support" after the decree is en- 
tered, thereby potentially allowing the custodial parent to re- 
ceive, in effect, double child support. This problem could be 
addressed by adding a provision to the settlement agreement to 
the effect that the spousal support would be reduced by 150% 
of any increase in child support. 
F. Avoid Excessive Administrative Control over Child Support 
Modification Decisions 
Judges have long been concerned about family disputes 
overloading court calendars. Indeed, an important justification 
for the American rule regarding child support modification was 
its tendency to discourage parents from seeking a subsequent 
judicial audience regarding a change in support. A number of 
states have attempted to relieve some of the burden family law 
200. See generally OLDHAM, supra note 111, at 453. 
201. Some courts have shown a willingness to look behind a label of "alimony" 
to see whether the award is in fact child support or a part of the property divi- 
sion. See, e.g., In re Gleason, 20 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1518 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) 
(treating payments deductible as alimony for tax purposes as child support pay- 
ments); Erickson v. Erickson, 449 N.W.2d 173 (WM. 1989) (finding that payments 
labelled as alimony really were child support); Schaffer v. Schaffer, 643 P.2d 1300, 
1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that payments labelled alimony were in fact part 
of the property division). 
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disputes impose on courts by creating administrative or quasi- 
judicial hearing officers to hear family law matters.202 
Alternatives to judicial proceedings have certain obvious 
advantages. Depending upon the job qualifications established 
for the decisionmaker, salary costs may be lower.203 Also, par- 
ties may incur less cost if they feel more inclined to participate 
in these proceedings without an  a t t ~ r n e y . ' ~  Further, judicial 
proceedings may be intimidating to parties. Still, the trend 
toward administrative determinations of child support matters 
does present some troublesome issues. 
An administrative system for child support determinations 
would be cheaper only if non-lawyers are hired to be the hear- 
ing officers. I t  is by no means clear that non-lawyers can ade- 
quately fulfill these tasks. First, although in some instances 
the calculation of the presumptive amount due under guide- 
lines is routine, in others child support calculations under the 
guidelines are complicated. For example, should an obligor's 
cafeteria plan benefits be included in income? What about capi- 
tal gains, expense account reimbursements, overtime pay, in- 
heritances or gifts?205 In addition, the guidelines themselves 
are sometimes extremely complicated.206 I have some concern 
whether non-lawyers could apply the  guideline^.^^' Second, 
the guidelines do not provide clear answers for all situations; 
decisionmakers are given substantial discretion. For example, 
some states do not s p e c i ~  a certain exact percentage for the 
support; the guideline provides that the support should be 
202. See generally H. Ted Rubin, Policy Issues with Quasi-Judicial Hearing 
Offzcers in Child Support Proceedings, ST. CT. J., Fall 1987, at  4; Barbara Everist, 
Comment, 34 S.D. L. REV. 573, 575 (1989) (summarizing South Dakota recommen- 
dations). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 3 518.551(10) (West Supp. 1994) (establishing 
an administrative process for child support). 
203. For example, of the hearing officers serving in New Jersey courts, about 
50% are lawyers. Interview with Raymond Rainvill, supra note 156. In contrast, 
the "masters" serving in Texas family courts are all lawyers. 
204. See Everist, supra note 202, at 576. 
205. A number of guidelines include such things as capital gains. Some even 
permit courts to consider gifts and inheritances. See, e-g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
3 2400-b)(e) (McKinney Su pp. 1994). 
206. The award for Most Complicated Guideline must go, by acclamation, to 
California. See CAL. FAM. CODE 3 4055 (West 1994). 
207. For example, the Australian Child Support Agency has been criticized for 
providing incorrect information to parties. See Margo Kingston, Maintenance. 
Scheme Fails Children, Says Judge, THE AGE, Mar. 6, 1992, at  16; Karen 
Middleton, Child Support Staff Under Fin! From Ombudsman, THE AGE, Oct. 7, 
1992, a t  6. 
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within a certain range of percentages, with the exact percent- 
age to  be selected by the decisionmaker based upon the parties' 
circumstan~es.'~~ Many other states give the decisionmaker 
discretion to consider whether to deviate from the guideline 
due to  various factors, such as if the obligor has remarried 
andlor has become responsible for the support of another 
or if the visitation arrangement has been substan- 
tially changed.'" In addition, a number of states permit the 
decisionmaker to impose child support at a rate higher than 
the guideline amount if it is determined that the obligor is 
underemployed.'" So, the calculation of child support in 
many instances will not be a ministerial task. The 
decisionmaker will have substantial discretion when awarding 
child support. Indeed, empirical studies find that American 
judges deviate from the presumptive guideline amount about 
one-fourth to one-third of the time.''' This is additional evi- 
dence that child 'support calculations under guidelines fie- 
quently are not mini~terial.~'~ It has traditionally been 
208. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 8 19-6-15 (Supp. 1994); Mass. Child Supp. 
Guidelines, part III(A), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, a t  
438. 
209. See generally Judith M. Billings, From Guesswork to Guideline+-The 
Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 859, 
874-75, 902; Rebecca Garland, Note, Second Children Second Best? Equal Protection 
for Successive Families Under State Child Support Guidelines, 18 HAST. CONST. 
L.Q. 881 (1991). 
210. See generally Melli & Brown, supra note 121. 
211. See, eg., PA. R. CIV. P. 1910.16-5 (c)(l) (disallowing downward adjustment 
for voluntary underemployment); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Sews., Child Support GuideJines 
para. III(A)(4) (Oct. 1987), in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 69, 
a t  857. 
212. See, eg., Marygold Melli & Judi Bartfeld, Use of the Wisconsin Percent- 
age-of-Income Standard to Set Child Support: Experience in Twenty Counties Sep- 
tember 1987-December 1989, Institute for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wisconsin 
(June 1991), at 4-5. The authors reviewed awards based upon the Wisconsin per- 
centage of the obligor's income standard. If the percentage of income ordered was 
within 2% of the guideline amount, the authors designated these orders as "in 
compliance" with the guidelines. The authors found that, based upon this definition 
of compliance, about one-third of the orders did not comply. 
The Center for Policy Research also studied the extent to which child support 
orders deviate from the guidelines. See The Impact of Child Support Guidelines: An 
Empirical Assessment of Three Models (October 1989). Awards within 10% of the 
amount suggested by the guideline were considered in compliance. The authors 
found that about 6W0 of the orders were in compliance, about 10% were higher 
than expected, and 3M were lower. Id. a t  69. 
A recent study by LewinACF, under the direction of Burt S. Barnow, also 
found a substantial rate of deviation. See LEWIMCF, supra note 61. 
213. Of course, one could argue that judges deviate too often, and that there 
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thought that lawyers are well-trained to exercise discretion; 
would it be wise t o  delegate such decisions to non-lawyers? 
If child support modification proceedings would be trans- 
ferred to  an administrative tribunal, one possible effect would 
be fewer deviations. In Australia, child support is set by an 
administrative body, but either party may appeal to  a judge for 
deviationO2l4 One observer of the recent Australian reforms 
states that parties in very few instances avail themselves of the 
right to appeal to a judge.215 Whether this would be perceived 
a benefit or a detriment would depend upon one's evaluation of 
the effects of judicial discretion in child support matters. 
Compared to judicial proceedings where the parties are 
represented by counsel, administrative procedures might not as 
thoroughly develop reliable financial information regarding the 
parties.'16 Because parents have been known to be less than 
forthright about their respective financial conditions when a 
child support obligation is being calculated, this is not a trivial 
concern. This concern presents the related issue of whether any 
advantage offered by legal representation is justified by the 
additional expense. 
One writer recently has noted that an increasing number 
of parties are not retaining a lawyer in family law matters, 
even where such disputes are being resolved by  court^.'^' Al- 
though to some degree this is attributed to the poverty of par- 
ties in family law matters, the author also attributes the rise to 
people's increasing interest in "self-help."218 This may suggest 
would be a lower deviation rate with administrative procedures. 
214. See generally Harrison, supm note 27. 
215. Id. at 230. I t  is unclear whether this is due to cost of the appeal or the 
judge's unwillingness to deviate from the formula applied by the administrative 
body. Australians may deviate from the formula if they make a private agreement 
regarding the amount of child support and are not receiving state support. Id. So, 
there may be more deviations in Australia than are indicated by the infrequent 
judicial appeals. 
Another commentator notes that in New Zealand, which has adopted a system 
similar to that of Australia, there are many appeals to courts to request a devia- 
tion from the formula, and that departure orders are frequently panted. See Atkin, 
supm note 165. 
216. See generally Mavis Maclean, Child Support in the United Kingdom: Mak- 
ing the Move fiom Court to Agency, 31 Hous. L. REV. 515 (1994). 
217. See Suzanne Northington, Pro Per Behavior, CAL. LAW., May 1994, at 29; 
see also Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Nternative to 
Attoney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553 (1993). 
218. See Northington, supra note 217. 
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that for many parties it is no cheaper to go to an administra- 
tive hearing than to court.219 
Transferring responsibility for child support modification to 
an administrative agency could present problems common to 
government bureaucracies. For example, many have com- 
plained about the rudeness and delays stemming from the 
Australian system.220 According to some reports, the Austra- 
lian Child Support Agency receives more complaints than any 
other Australian government agency.221 Of course, to some 
extent this could be attributed to the low level of funding of the 
Child Support Agency.2zz The new English Child Support Of- 
fice also has received a great deal of c r i t i ~ i s m . ~ ~  
If all matters pertaining to child support would be allocat- 
ed to an agency, including the initial award, this would present 
additional issues. Judges and parties now tend to look at the 
economic settlement, including the property division, spousal 
support, if any, and child support, as a package. If a court has 
the power to determine all three matters, this gives the court 
great flexibility. The court's options would be restricted if 
courts no longer had the power to award child support. 
When considering whether to allocate responsibility for 
child support determinations to a court or an  administrative 
body, some states have adopted a compromise solution. They 
allow hearing officers or other officials to hear child support 
matters and their recommendations are forwarded to a 
219. One study of divorcing couples found that neither party was represented 
in over half of all cases; in 90% of all cases, one litigant was not represented. See 
Sales et al., supra note 217, at  594. 
For a general discussion of suggestions regarding pro se procedures for child 
support modification, see generally Eleanor Landstreet & M a r i a ~ e  Takas, U.S. 
Dep't of Health and Hum. Sews., Developing Effective Procedures for Pro Se Modi- 
fication of Child Support Awards (Sept. 1991). 
220. See, e.g., Anne Crawford, Committee to Call for Alimony Crackdown, THE 
AGE, Jan. 9, 1994, at  7; Enrica Longo, Child Agency Complaints Draw Fire, THE 
AGE, Aug. 30, 1993, at  2; Middleton, supra note 207, at 6; Caroline Milburn, Re- 
duce Child Support, Say Fathers, THE AGE, July 21, 1993, at 7; Sue Neales, Look- 
ing at  a Broader Child Support Scheme, Aus r~ .  FIN. REV., Oct. 30, 1990, a t  55. 
221. See Prudence Anderson, Child Support Body Criticized, AUSTL. RN. REV., 
August 30, 1993, at 7; Longo, supra note 220, at 2. 
222. See Enrica Longo, Tax Ofice to Pay Under Child Support Pact, THE AGE, 
July 17, 1993, at 5. 
223. See Patricia Wynn Davies & Marianne MacDonald, Lilley Gives Child 
Support Agency Another Chance, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), July 5, 1994, at  1. 
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judge? This could be another way to ease court congestion 
while retaining some judicial supervision of the process. 
In almost all states, a child support obligation is expressed 
as a fixed amount. This amount is not adjusted or modified 
until the child becomes emancipated, unless a parent can es- 
tablish that the circumstances of one of the parents or the child 
have materially changed. This rule erodes the real value of 
child support unless the custodial parent initiates a new legal 
proceeding, and is unfair to that parent. At a minimum, a child 
support expressed as a fixed amount should periodically be 
adjusted automatically for increases in the cost of living.225 
Alternatively, the child support obligation could be expressed 
as a percentage of the obligor's income, not as a fxed amount, 
with a minimum self-support reserve deducted and a specified 
cap for high-income  obligor^.^" This would allow the award 
to adjust to changes in the obligor's financial situation without 
further court action. In most instances, either adjustment 
mechanism will result in higher awards for custodial fami- 
Rules for modification of child support orders should be 
clarified.z28 Currently, orders may not be modified unless a 
parent proves the circumstances of one of the parties have 
substantially changed. No objective standard is provided in 
most states. The "substantial change in circumstances" stan- 
dard grants the judge too much discretion and provides too 
little guidance to the parties, thereby potentially discouraging 
some valid claims and encouraging some spurious ones. If an  
objective standard for what presumptively constituted a sub- 
stantial change in circumstances would be established, this 
standard would give parents guidance regarding when modifi- 
cation would be successfid and would facilitate consistent re- 
sults. In addition, it would encourage valid claims and discour- 
224. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 25-7A-22 (1992). Also, New Jersey 
and Texas have accepted such a procedure. In New Jersey, the officer is called a 
"hearing officer;" in Texas, a "master." 
225. See supra part IIIA. 
226. See supra part 1II.C. 
227. Bartfeld & Garfinkel, supra note 78, at 12. 
228. See supra IV.B.1. 
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age claims where the change in child support would not be 
significant. 
Furthermore, spouses should be obligated to exchange 
financial information periodically, so each parent could judge 
(based upon the promulgated objective standard) whether modi- 
fication of child support would be possible.229 Finally, the 
state child support agency should hire employees to calculate, 
upon the request of either parent, the presumptive amount of 
child support due, based upon the current circumstances of the 
parties. 
Any system of modification of child support needs to reflect 
an  awareness that a divorce settlement is a economic package. 
The property settlement and spousal support, if any, can affect 
the child support obligation. At times a custodial parent may 
wish to agree to a child support amount lower or higher than 
the presumptive guideline amount, in exchange for some other 
economic concession. The rules for modification should permit 
such bargaining, with certain public policy limits.230 
Some suggest that child support decrees should be re- 
viewed automatically a t  certain intervals. If the reforms sug- 
gested above are adopted, an automatic review of all orders is 
unnecessary. The current policy of limiting such reviews to 
parents receiving AFDC benefits seems wise.231 
229. See supra part 1V.A. 
230. See supra parts 1V.D-E. 
231. See supra part 1V.C. 
